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Anderson: Anderson: Preliminary Hearing

THE PRELIMINARY HEARINGBETTER ALTERNATIVES OR MORE OF THE SAME?
GARY

L.

ANDERSON*

In recent years we have witnessed a comprehensive and unprecedented
reappraisal of pre-trial criminal procedure in this country by all elements
of the legal fraternity. Much of the discussion and many of the changes
in criminal procedure are the result of, and are vitally affected by, recent
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the
subject of procedural Due Process.1 The comprehensive and complex nature
of the reappraisal is revealed in the broad proposal for legislative reform
being prepared by the American Law Institute in the form of a Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure2 and in the various recommendations
and studies of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice.3
In view of the many proposals being made for reform and the recent
Supreme Court decision in Coleman v. Alabama,4 a number of questions
concerning the usefulness and development of the preliminary hearing
should be considered. Statements have been made, most notably by prosecutors and persons interested in crime control, that the preliminary hearing is a waste of time and effort.5 On the other hand, many defense attor*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri; formerly Prosecuting
Attorney of Union County, Iowa; B.S., Iowa State University, 1960; J.D., University
of Iowa, 1962; LL.M., Harvard University, 1968.
1. E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S.Ct. 1999 (1970) (right to counsel at preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
2. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGNmENT PROCEDuRE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966,
No. 2, 1969, No. 3, 1970; Study Draft No. 1, 1968). None of these drafts deal with
the preliminary hearing.

3. E.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO DIscovERY AND PROcEDuRE BEFORE TRL
(Tent. Draft, 1969); STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (Approved Draft,
1968); STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (Approved Draft,

1968).
4. 90 S.Ct. 1999 (1970), holding that the preliminary hearing is a "critical
stage" in Alabama's criminal process at which the accused is as much entitled
to the aid of counsel as at the trial itself. Since most states now make no provision for appointment of counsel to serve the accused at the preliminary hearing,
see note 19 infra, the Coleman decision is bound to cause a reappraisal of the
preliminary hearing in many states. Justice White, in a concurring opinion in
Coleman, speculates that "requiring the appointment of counsel may result in
fewer preliminary hearings in jurisdictions where the prosecutor is free to avoid
them by taking a case directly to a grand jury" and that "[o]ur ruling may also
invite eliminating the preliminary hearing system entirely." Id. at 2008.
5. E.g., Hearings on the U. S. Commissioner System before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 126-28 (1965) (remarks of Warren Olney III, Di(281)
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neys, and even the Supreme Court in the Coleman case, have found many
reasons for defending the hearing as a "critical stage" of a state's criminal
process. 6 Defenders of the hearing, while recognizing certain procedural
problems, generally advocate "strengthening" the hearing through procedural reforms and by extending it to serve more functions in the criminal
process. In practice, few prosecutors and defense attorneys who have
seriously considered the matter are satisfied with the basic preliminary
hearing procedures that have developed in this country; yet they cannot
agree on reforms that would protect the interests of the individual while
respecting the needs of law enforcement.
Proposals for retention and reform of preliminary hearing procedures
raise the basic issue of whether the gains from such an approach outweigh
the disadvantages, including the expenditure of substantial time and
scarce resources on early judicial hearings and the possible cost of distorting or delaying other desirable procedural reforms. Proposals to eliminate
the hearing or to reduce its functions raise the same basic issues and require the development of other procedures to perform functions now
served by a hearing.
The first part of this article analyzes the preliminary hearing as a
working institution. The second part sets out and evaluates current proposals and prospects for improving the hearing through reform. In the
third part a set of alternative procedures is proposed which might function better than a judicial hearing with multiple functions, and comparisons are made with present and proposed hearing procedures.
Throughout the article it will be assumed that any proposal for reform
should fairly and effectively protect the interests of the accused while
rector, Admin. Office of U. S. Courts) [hereinafter cited as 1965 or 1966 Hearings].
The Subcommittee conducted extensive hearings which indicated that the proper
role of the preliminary hearing was the aspect of the system about which confusion
was greatest.
6. Comment, Preliminary Hearings-The Case for Revival, 39 U. COLo. L.
REv. 580 (1967); Napley, The Case for PreliminaryInquiries, 1966 CRm. L. REv.
490; see Note, The PreliminaryHearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. Rrv. 164

(1965).

Speaking for three members of the majority of the Supreme Court in Coleman
v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. at 2003 (1970), Justice Brennan summarized the "critical stage"
arguments often used by defenders of the hearing:
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to protect the indigent accused against an erroneous or improper
prosecution. First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination
of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case, that may lead
the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event,
the skilled interrogation of witnesses... can fashion a vital impeachment
tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear
at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case
the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a
proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be
influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for
the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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respecting the needs of law enforcement. In addition, any proposal for reform should take population growth into account and should be designed
to help solve the problems of pre-trial criminal procedure in an urban
setting. Finally, any proposal for reform at the preliminary hearing stage
should be consistent with recent progressive proposals for reform that are
being implemented at other stages of the criminal process.
I.

FUNCIONS

op

PRELIMINARY HEARING PROCEDURE

Before a proper evaluation of any procedural stage in the criminal process can be made, one must identify the goals or primary functions of the procedure and distinguish them from incidental functions that may be served.
Incidental functions served by the procedure in its early years of development may be promoted later as primary goals of the procedure, particularly
if there are no other procedures available to serve these functions. Promoters
of reform will then argue that changes in basic procedures should be made
so that the entire procedure may better serve certain functions once considered incidental. These procedural changes may be made gradually
through an evolutionary process in which little consideration is given to
factors other than the anticipated benefits of each minor change. The end
product of these accumulated "improvements" may be an unwieldy multipurpose procedural institution which does not serve any function very efficiently or effectively. The end product also may be a procedural structure of functional compromises which in practice satisfies no one, but which,
in theory, has become so identified with the underlying values and goals
of the criminal justice system that it may be considered inviolable by
many. At this point some authorities are likely to urge a certain amount
of constitutional protection for the institution. 7 Already some authorities
argue that the preliminary hearing may now be so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people that there should be a constitutional
right to the hearing.8 Therefore, it is time to see whether there are viable
7. This attitude led to the widespread constitutional protection of the grand
jury indictment. Felony prosecutions under federal law and in 24 states can be
initiated only by indictment. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.; Calkins, Abolition of the
Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 424 n.6 (states listed with
methods of initiating felony prosecutions). Calkins argues that the grand jury has
lost its historical importance and vitality and become "a cumbersome fifth wheel
in the administration of criminal justice." Id. at 444-45. Yet he only advocates
abolishing the indictment as the sole means of initiating prosecutions. Id. Since
the grand jury system is not likely to be abolished, proposals for reforming other
procedures must be adapted accordingly.
The development of the preliminary hearing as an evidentiary screen to
eliminate unfounded charges formed the basis for arguments that the grand
jury screen should be abolished. Id. at 430, 432-33.
8. In Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913), it was held there is no
due process right to the hearing because of its preliminary nature and lack of
finality. But see Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA
L. REv. 164, 181-83 (1965); Hearings on S. 3475, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 154
(1965) (citing Note and recent Supreme Court cases on right to counsel and con-
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alternatives developing or which could be developed to take the place of the
preliminary hearing, which would be more efficient and effective than a

hearing.
A. Development of a Multi-PurposeInstitution
The preliminary hearing has a long history involving the gradual
accretion of new functions never contemplated by the Englishmen who
brought it into being. Originating over four hundred years ago in two
statutes,0 the basic historic functions of the hearing were inquisition and
prevention of indiscriminate releasing of prisoners.' 0 The basic functions
performed by the justice of the peace were to question witnesses and to
"bind over" suspects for later criminal proceedings by committing them
to jail or by requiring them to furnish bail."1 Binding over was automatic
unless it clearly appeared that no crime had been committed or that there
were no grounds to suspect that the accused had committed the crime.' 2
The accused was closely examined in secret, prosecution witnesses were
not examined in his presence, he was not permitted to have legal counsel,
and he was not entitled to see or hear the evidence against him.' 3 Thus
the entire proceeding was established for the benefit of the prosecution, and
the accused usually benefited only from the setting of bail.14
1. Benefits for the accused
By the early part of the nineteenth century, the practice of conducting an inquisition of the accused fell into disfavor, probably as a reaction
frontation at hearing); but cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970). Some state
constitutional provisions require a preliminary hearing or its waiver prior to
prosecution by information. ALI CoDE OF CRINNAL PRocEDuRE 435 (1930). Many
other states require a preliminary hearing by statute prior to prosecution by information. Id. at 435-38; § 544.250 RSMo, 1969.
9. An Act Appointing an Order to Justices of Peace for the Bailment of
Prisoners, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (repealed, provided for examination of
prisoner and witnesses only if prisoner was bailed); An Act to take Examination
of Prisoners Suspected of Manslaughter or Felony, 2 &3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (repealed,
examination of prisoner and witnesses when prisoner not bailed). The coroner's
inquest was the earliest procedure resembling the preliminary hearing. After
1554, the coroner was empowered to bind over witnesses to appear at trial and
required to put material evidence into writing. I W. HoLmswotTa, HisToRy OF ENGLISH LAW 84-85 (5th ed. 1931).
10. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 387-91 (1956).
11. Id. As late as 1823 the justice was held to be acting inquisitorially and
not judicially in examining the prisoner and witnesses against him and in putting
the material evidence into writing. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 296.
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *296. The justice also could bind over
prosecution witnesses to appear at trial. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 296.
13. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 296-97. In 1848 the accused was given
rights to confrontation, to call witnesses, and to make a statement, creating a judicial proceeding. Id. at 297.
14. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 529.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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against harsh and oppressive "star chamber" methods of investigation.15
Emphasis shifted to a goal of judicial inquiry into the evidentiary foundation of complaints. As a prerequisite to binding over, the prosecution was
required to present enough evidence to show that a crime had been committed and that there was "probable cause" to believe that the accused
16
had committed it.
As the hearing developed in this country into an evidentiary screen
to eliminate unfounded charges, reformers argued that an adversary proceeding would serve better to protect the accused from illegal detention and
also serve to protect him from the annoyance and costs of having to defend
himself at a public trial. 17 It followed that the accused must be allowed
the right to secure counsel for the hearing,18 and legislation has been considered in recent years to require appointment of counsel for the indigent
accused.19 It also followed that at an adversary hearing the accused should
have the right to make a statement in his own behalf,20 to produce witnesses
15. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 266 (1930). The practice of inquisition did not follow the preliminary hearing to America because of early constitutional provisions against self-incrimination. Id. at 271-73.
16. This standard developed in America, and variations may be found in the
statutes; e.g., "sufficient cause," found in many statutes. ALI CoDE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

308-11 (1930).

17. The accused usually cannot appear or present evidence to the grand
jury. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1170 n.60 (1960). In Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103,
189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922), the court stated:
The object or purpose of the preliminary investigation is to prevent hasty,
malicious, improvident and oppressive prosecutions, to protect the person
charged from open and public accusations of crime, to avoid both for the
defendant and the public the expense of a public trial, and to save the
defendant from the humiliation and anxiety involved in a public prosecu-

tion, and to discover whether or not there are substantial grounds upon

which a prosecution may be based.
18. By 1980, at least 32 states permitted the accused to have assistance of

counsel at the hearing. ALI

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE

279-80 (1930)

(statutes

only). By 1969, all states except Maryland, Mississippi, and Rhode Island specifically permitted the accused to have counsel at the hearing, by statute, court rule,
or case law. Maryland, Mississippi, and Rhode Island require prosecution by indictment in felony cases.
19. In 1930, apparently no state required appointment of counsel to assist
an indigent accused at the hearing. Id. By 1969, at least 14 states required such
appointment unless the hearing or the right to counsel is waived: California, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, New
Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Many other states probably began to require appointment of counsel as a matter of practice in felony

cases after White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965). Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S.Ct. 1999 (1970), dearly requires appointment
of counsel for the hearing. See notes 4 8 6 supra. If counsel is not provided and
the accused is later tried and convicted, the conviction will be sustained only if
the denial of counsel was harmless error under the test of Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967). 90 S.Ct. at 2004.
20. In 1930, statutes in 8 states permitted the accused to make an unsworn
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCMDURE 289-91 (1930). By
1969, at least 15 states permitted this: Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.

statement in his behalf. ALI

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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in his defense, 2 ' and to confront and cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution.22 Model legislation was proposed and followed by many states that
sought to extend basic trial rights to the preliminary hearing. 23
Reformers further argued that the preliminary hearing should be required promptly so that persons would not be arrested on "suspicion" or
unnecessarily detained in jail. A mere requirement that the accused be
brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay24 would not prevent
many investigative arrests or unnecessary detention; an early judicial determination of probable cause was needed.2 5 These arguments were made first
in horse-and-buggy days when the grand jury, the final evidentiary screen in
the pretrial process, met at infrequent intervals. A person arrested on "suspicion" who did not receive a prompt preliminary hearing might be
held in jail without probable cause for months while the prosecution continued its investigation. 26 If no probable cause developed in the course of
the investigation, the suspect might be deprived of his liberty without
redress until the next grand jury returned an ignoramus or until a preliminary hearing was held. Even if probable cause did appear at some point,
there previously had been a period of illegal "suspect" detention.2 In
21. In 1930, statutes in 37 states permitted examination of witnesses for the

accused. Id. at 293-94. At least 30 of these states permitted the accused to testify

as a witness. Id. at 294-96. By 1969, all states except Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
New Jersey, South Carolina, and Washington expressly permitted defense wit-

nesses to testify at the hearing.

22. In 1930, statutes in 15 states required confrontation and permitted crossexamination by or on behalf of the accused. ALI CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
287-88 (1930). 19 additional states required examination of witnesses in the presence of the accused. Id. at 288-89. Some of these states no doubt permitted crossexamination. By 1969, all states except Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia required confrontation and
permitted cross-examination by or on behalf of the accused. Nebraska, Tennessee,
and Virginia require examination of witnesses in the presence of the accused.
23. UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1952); ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL
PRocEDuRE (1930).

24. In 1930, statutes in 13 states so provided, and statutes in 5 others contained similar provisions. ALI CODE oF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 205-6 (1930). By
1969, 26 states provided that the accused must be brought before a judge without
unnecessary delay, and 13 others had similar provisions.
25. In 1950, statutes in 13 states required examination of witnesses "as soon
as may be," and 14 states required examination "immediately after the appearance
of counsel, or if, after waiting a reasonable time therefor, none appears...." Id.
at 281. 11 of these 27 states also required an initial appearance before the magistrate without unnecessary delay. In 1969, 10 of the 13 states still required examinations "as soon as may be," and 13 of 14 states still required examinations immediately after the appearance of counsel .... " However, 13 states had adopted
similar provisions, most of them requiring the examination "within a reasonable
time."
26. Statutes were adopted which placed time limits on postponements of the
hearing ranging from one to thirty days, most of which required no "good cause"
showing for postponement. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 282-84 (1930). In
1930 there were 52 statutes of this kind. Id. Few states have changed these statutes
since then, although some have adopted the "reasonable time" standard in place
of a day limit and a few have shortened the time limits.
27. Deprivation of liberty becomes extremely objectionable after a brief
period of "preliminary screening" during which the police and prosecutor are
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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each instance there was a denial of a basic right not to be subjected to
physical restraint except for good cause shown.
Good cause for physical restraint cannot be equated with probable
cause. When probable cause is found at the preliminary hearing and the
accused is bound over, American courts have held that the risk of nonappearance at later proceedings is the only "good cause" for holding him
in jail. 2s Thus another function of the preliminary hearing often is the
setting of the proper amount of bail. Although the magistrate also must
set bail when the hearing is waived, the hearing provides an opportunity
for the accused and his counsel to present evidence and arguments to the
magistrate and the prosecutor 2 9 which may produce a more favorable bail
arrangement than otherwise could be expected. Once the magistrate has
fixed bail, it takes a later showing of good cause to justify a reduction.3 0
The preliminary hearing also serves the function of informing the
accused about the details of the charge against him. The complaint, indictment, or information seldom give sufficient information about the charge
and the state's case to enable the defense to prepare for trial or to permit
realistic plea bargaining.31 This does not mean that defense counsel can
use the hearing as a means of discovering all relevant facts known to the
state, but the hearing does serve a limited discovery function incidental
to its screening function. 32 Whether discovery is an appropriate goal of
surveying the evidence to see whether there is "probable cause" for prosecution.
"It is clear that in many situations where there is 'reasonable cause' which justifies
an arrest, some further investigation should precede a decision to charge." ALI
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE xxiii (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
28. W. LaFave, Arrest, The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody 177,
206-7 (1965). Attempts to pass laws permitting "preventive detention" based on
dangerousness have met stiff opposition on constitutional grounds. But see § 23-1322
of the recently enacted District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 1970, Pub. Law No. 91-358 (July 29, 1970).
29. See quote from Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2003 (1970), note
6 supra. A magistrate often may look to the prosecutor for guidance in making
the bail decision. He may be influenced by evidence relating to the seriousness
of the offense, the character of the defendant and his economic status, and
any hardship to the defendant or his family which incarceration would produce.
Cf. W. LaFave, supra note 28, at 178-83.
30. Statutes variously defining sufficient cause for a change in bail are
collected in ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 375-76 (1930).

31. See quote from Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2003 (1970), note 6
supra. Until recent times the indictment or information usually gave the accused
extensive information about the charge against him. It was required to be precise
and no variance was permitted between allegations and proof at trial. Modem
indictments and information generally have lost this specificity and often a formal
charge follows statutory language. A motion for a bill of particulars usually is
directed to the courts discretion and may be denied on the ground that the
accused is going on a "fishing expedition" for evidence. Goldstein, The State and
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1173-76
(1960). Thus the hearing may be the only opportunity for the defense to learn
much about the charge and the state's case, in the absence of other means of
criminal discovery.
32. See quote from Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2003 (1970), note 6
supra.
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the hearing is currently a matter of considerable dispute. Most courts take
the historical view that it is not, but a few courts dearly have attempted to
expand the hearing into a mechanism of discovery.33
As the hearing becomes more adversary in nature, other incidental
functions related to discovery of evidence become more important. Effective
defense counsel can make good use of an early opportunity to cross-examine
key prosecution witnesses. If a record of the testimony is kept, witness
testimony will be frozen, since "depositions" can be used to impeach witnesses at trial and to preserve favorable testimony of witnesses unavailable
at trial.3 4 After learning something about the strength of the state's case,
defense counsel will have a better basis for plea negotiations with the prose.
cutor. If the state's case appears weak, defense counsel will be in a much
better bargaining position. On the other hand, a strong case presented
by the state may help defense counsel convince his client that he should
plead guilty.
2. Benefits for the prosecution

Having been established for the benefit of the prosecution, the preliminary hearing continues to serve many prosecution interests. The
most important benefit for the prosecution is the early opportunity afforded to weed out cases that should go no further. Defense counsel can
assist the prosecutor in testing state witnesses under adversary conditions.8 5
The prosecutor may learn that the charge is based on misinformation or
prejudice. 30 He may also discover that certain state witnesses are weak,
33. See Note, Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia-an Emerging
Discovery Device, 56 Gro. L.J. 191 (1967). Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in
Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2010 (1970), suggests that the Court may

have had a need-for-greater-discovery motivation for requiring counsel at the preliminary hearing, see quote, note 6 supra.
Congress has acted to forestall federal court efforts to turn the hearing into a
discovery device. A prior grand jury indictment now dearly moots the hearing.

Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (Supp. IV, 1969); Weinberg &:Weinberg, The CongressionalInvitation to Avoid the PreliminaryHearing:An Analysis
of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 Micn. L. REv. 1361, 1390

(1969).

34. See quote from Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2003 (1970), note
6 supra.

Possible disadvantages of state witnesses appearing at an early adversary
hearing should be noted. Witnesses may become identified with the prosecution and
antagonistic to the defense when they are cross-examined without any prior contact with defense counsel. In sensational cases, the witnesses and the public
may learn the morbid details of the crime as a result of the hearing. These problems often cause defense attorneys to advise waiver of the hearing. Thus the accused may lose the only opportunity, absent other means of discovery, to confront
and cross-examine key witnesses prior to trial.
35. The prosecutor may not learn certain weaknesses of his witnesses when
he questions them before the grand jury, in the absence of defense counsel.
36. Complaining witnesses often have selfish motives for promoting certain
types of prosecutions, e.g., "to get even," to secure the payment of a debt or a bad
check. See generally Miller, The PreliminaryHearing, 15 A.B.A.J. 414 (1929).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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unwilling to cooperate, or adverse to the prosecution. The hearing may
show that the charge should be changed, reduced, or dismissed. If the
charge is reduced to a misdemeanor within the jurisdiction of the court,
the accused may decide to plead guilty immediately. If it appears that a
state witness may not be available for trial, his "deposition" can be taken
at the hearing,3 7 or the prosecutor can ask the magistrate to require a
bond from a witness at the hearing to insure his appearance in later pro38
ceedings.
The hearing may serve important incidental functions for the prosecution corresponding to those for the defense. The defendant may be induced
to plead guilty after the filing of a prosecutor's information s9 or to enter
plea negotiations because of the strength of the state case. As a practical
matter prosecutors in urban areas must bargain with defense counsel in
order to maintain a high rate of guilty pleas.4 0 If the accused chooses to
present evidence, the prosecutor may discover the substance of the defense.
B. Functionalfrustrations under current procedures
Although the preliminary hearing theoretically can serve many important functions insuring the fair administration of criminal justice at
the pre-trial stage, in practice it often fails to perform its functions well.
When held, the hearing often fails to serve as an effective evidentiary
screen to weed out unfounded charges. There are many reasons for this.
First of all, a large proportion of magistrates and justices of the peace who
are supposed to make an informed "judicial" determination of probable
cause have had litle or no formal legal training. 41 Secondly, these judicial of37. Recorded testimony of witnesses is admissible at trial only if statutory

or court rule requirements are met. See statutes cited in ALI CODE OF CRUMINAL
PROCED RE 303-8 (1930). In addition, the constitutional right to counsel must

have been granted at the preliminary, for it is a "critical stage' in the criminal
process. Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970). See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (defendant lacked counsel, transcript not admissible at trial).
38. In 1930, 41 states gave this power to the magistrate. ALI CODE OF CIrINAL PROcEDuRE

316-20 (1930). For a more recent summary of the law in this

area see Carlson, Jailing the Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness, 55 IA.
L. REv. 1 (1969).
39. The probable cause finding of the preliminary hearing is often a prerequisite to the filing of a prosecutor's information. Note, Initiation of Prosecution
by Information-Leave of Court or Preliminary Examination?, 25 MONT. L. Rv.
135, 137 n.5 (1963) (constitutions and statutes cited).
40. See generally Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining:Compromises by Prosecutors
to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865-71 (1964).
41. "In more than 30 States justices of the peace are not required to be lawyers, and the incompetence with which many perform their judicial functions has
long been reported." THm CHALLENGE OF CRmM IN A FREE SocIEry, A REPORT BY
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINIsTRATION OF
JusTicE 129 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRasmmrr's COUISSIN REPORT]. The

President's Commission recommends abolishing two-court systems and transferring
the duties of lower court judges to full-time judges in unified criminal courts, or
at least improving the quality, and increasing the responsibilities and training of
lower court judges. Id. at 129-30.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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ficers often have a heavy workload because they usually have jurisdicition to
try most misdemeanor and all petty offense cases in addition to their
power to process the preliminary stages of felony cases. The large volume
of cases of all types processed by each magistrate, particularly in urban
areas, is reflected in delay and inability to give more than cursory consideration to individual cases.42 Furthermore, many of these officers are compensated by fees assessed against the parties, and the resulting competition
43
for business can seriously threaten their independence from the police.
It is not surprising that these and other factors result in "assembly line justice" and a tremendous disparity between theory and practice at the preliminary hearing stage. 44
The disparity between theory and practice in rural areas is probably
much less because of lighter caseloads and more time for individual hearings. However, under rural or small town conditions it seems more likely
that there will be a part-time magistrate who is unskilled and more dependent upon local law enforcement officers because he is compensated
by costs and fees according to the number of cases he handles. His probable
fear of offending the police and prosecutor, the knowledge that there is
no finality to a preliminary hearing discharge of the accused, 45 the absence
of appellate or trial court review of questionable findings of probable
cause,4 6 and the knowledge that the prosecutor is usually in a better position to decide whether a case could be prosecuted successfully, all create a
common judicial disposition to bind over most accused persons. In the
best of circumstances there will be little outside pressure on a magistrate
to act as a responsible screen.
Even if a magistrate is skilled, not too busy, and mindful of his judicial obligation to serve as a responsible evidentiary screen, "probable cause"
ordinarily is such an indefinite and minimal standard of proof that it
cannot furnish the "innocent" accused with much protection against being
held until the prosecutor or grand jury make a formal charge decision.
Usually the prosecutor will be required to present only a skeletal out42.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: Tim COURTS 31-32 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAx
FoRCE REPORT: THE COURTS].
43. PRFSIDENT'S COMISSION REPORT 129.
44. TASK FoRc- REPORT: THE COURTS 30-32.

45. A determination of "no probable cause" does not prevent the accused
from being prosecuted by indictment, which conclusively determines the existence
of probable cause. See Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932); State v.
Green, 305 S.W.2d 863, 868-69 (Mo. 1957). Moreover, in states in which a finding
of probable cause at the hearing is a prerequisite to the filing of a prosecutor's
information, the state may choose to start over and attempt to show probable
cause at a second hearing.
46. Usually the only way the accused can challenge the sufficiency of the evidence is by habeas corpus, which will not be granted if there is any legally competent evidence to support the probable cause finding. Goldstein, The State and
the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YA.LE L.J. 1149, 1168
n.53 (1960).
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line of the state's evidence supporting each element of the offense and
showing that the accused probably committed it. 47 Hearsay evidence may
48
be used in most states to sustain this minimal burden of proof.
Although the hearing ordinarily does not add a significant evidentiary screen to the process to weed out unfounded charges, many authorities believe that it can serve as an effective mechanism for determining the
legality of detention. 49 Undoubtedly prompt appearance before a magistrate
coupled with an early hearing can perform this function. However, common
postponement of the hearing for days or weeks allows the police to continue their investigation,50 and often the prosecutor will "moot" the hearing
by obtaining a grand jury indictment before it is held.5 1 Crowded dockets
in lower urban courts often cause long continuances. 52 These practices have
led some authorities to argue that the hearing procedure is obsolete and
47. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (search warrant
case) the Court said:
In dealing with probable cause ... we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act....
J P]roof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
48. TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 43; cf. Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359 (1956) (upholding indictment based completely on hearsay). The permissive attitude on use of hearsay is based on the fact that the accused will get
a fair hearing at the time of trial; however, the state sometimes may not have
enough competent evidence to sustain a formal charge, and the accused may sit
in jail for many months awaiting trial.
49. See authorities and trends in legislation, notes 25 & 26 supra.Hearings,89th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 270 (1966) (statement of Prof. A. Kenneth Pye):
One of the most important purposes is to provide protection against arrests
for investigation. It is not only a determination of probable cause but a
determination of probable cause shortly after arrest which is significant.
50. Although many state provisions require a hearing to be held within a
"reasonable time," a magistrate ordinarily has the power, at least "for good
cause shown," to grant a continuance at the request of the prosecution or the defense. An early hearing cannot mean an immediate hearing in most instances, as
this would place an impossible burden on the state to have its witnesses available
at the time of arrest or initial appearance before the magistrate. In determining
what is a reasonable time, the magistrate must necessarily consider time reasonably
required for preparation. E.g., James v. Lawrence, 176 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (18
day continuance reasonable time). There is nothing to prevent the prosecution
from using evidence gained from investigation subsequent to a continuance.
Attempts have been made to put limits on the "reasonable time" within which
the hearing must be held, note 26 supra; Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3060(b) (Supp. IV, 1969) (10 day limit if accused in jail, otherwise 20 days).
51. A grand jury indictment eliminates any recessity for a preliminary hearing.
Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (Supp. IV, 1969); cases cited note 45
supra; but see Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (remand for hearing
after indictment). Many prosecutors, most notably federal district attorneys, habitually secure grand jury indictments before the date set for the hearing. In states
maintaining absolute secrecy in grand jury proceedings, this maneuver may avoid
any possibility of pretrial discovery by the defense.
52. TAsK

FoRcE REPORT:

THE COURTS 180 (10 to 14 days, Recorder's Court

in Detroit), 143 n.26 (two to three week delay in Miami). In a Model Timetable
for Processing of Criminal Cases, the REPORT, id. at 85, recommends a maximum
time limit of 72 hours between the initial appearance and preliminary hearing.
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should be eliminated.53 Yet there remains a great need for some means of
determining the legality of detention at an early stage, particularly in
urban areas with substantial crime problems where investigative arrests
are likely to be made.5 4 A society which guarantees "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures"5 5
should afford an early opportunity to challenge the cause for detention.
Considering the general low quality of justice at the preliminary
hearing stage, it might seem strange that there are many authorities
who advocate making greater use of the hearing.5 6 However, it appears on
closer examination that most advocates of the hearing are concerned with
the need for greater criminal discovery.57 These advocates see the hearing
as an adaptable institution which may justify its continued existence and
expanded use by providing the accused with an opportunity to discover
and preserve evidence. Thus the hearing must be "improved" because
in its present form and with its present limited use it cannot provide broad
criminal discovery.58 Some advocates of the hearing, from states which permit prosecution by information, claim to be motivated primarily by the
desire to have a better judicial evidentiary screen to serve as a check on
prosecutorial discretion.5 9 They make an appealing dual argument that

53. E.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 126. In practice, "mooting" the hearing
by indictment has led to the disappearance of the hearing in some jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 253-54 (1966) (E. D. Mich. rarely
has, grand jury sits every other week); zd. at 220 (no defendant in S.D.N.Y. has
ever had hearing). State prosecutors are more selective and usually do not engage
in blanket "mooting" of all hearings.
54. The writ of habeas corpus may be used to secure the early release of
some persons; but this remedy is limited in effectiveness. Note 46 supra.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, applicable to the states through amend. XIV.
This right cannot be protected adequately by substituting early ex parte determinations of probable cause by busy grand juries for the protection of judicial
review of the evidence. Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois,
1966 U. ILL. L. F. 423, 432-33.
56. Note 6 supra; K. GRAHAMi and L. LmwiN, A STUDY OF THE PRELImINARY
HEARING IN Los ANGELES 172 (1969).
57. See, e.g., TAsK FORCE REPoaT: THE CouRTs 43 (recognizing weaknesses
but advocating greater discovery function); Comment, Preliminary Hearings-The
Case for Revival, 39 U. COLO. L. Rxv. 580, 583-84 (1967); Hearings, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 211, 214 (1966).
58. There are many reasons for this. In addition to the practice of "mooting"
hearings by indictment and the minimal evidence which the prosecution must
present to show probable cause, it is possible that the accused may obtain some
discovery concerning the initial charge but then be indicted and tried on a different charge. Also, the goal of an early hearing to prevent unlawful detention
conflicts with the practical consideration that counsel needs time and "preliminary
discovery" before he can effectively use the hearing as a discovery device. In short,
the hearing provides only "preliminary discovery" about the charge, the accusers,
and the strength of the prosecution's case. See generally Hearings on S. 945 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in the Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 241-41a (1967) (remarks of Sen. Joseph
Tydings on Senate floor).
59. This argument is effective where the preliminary hearing or its waiver is
a prerequisite to the filing of a prosecutor's information. Note 39 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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alterations in hearing procedure should be made not only to provide a
tighter evidentiary screen, so that only persons who are "really guilty" are
likely to be prosecuted, but also to provide more criminal discovery.

II.

PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING THE EXISTING INSTITUTION

At this point it should he apparent that if we desire to attain the
goals of the modem preliminary hearing in practice, including the goal
of greater criminal discovery, we must either reform existing hearing
procedures or develop alternate procedures. These two basic approaches,
reform and replacement of existing procedures, will be investigated and
discussed individually and then compared. 60
In order to properly evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each
approach, one needs a device to serve as a framework for discussion and
comparison. We will proceed to build two models of "ideal procedure," one
reflecting current trends and recommendations on ways to improve preliminary hearing procedure, and the other reflecting the author's thesis
that a better system of procedures might be developed to eliminate or drastically reduce the need for hearings while adequately protecting the interests of all parties concerned.

A. Model Preliminary Hearing Procedure
The first model, which shall be referred to as the "Hearing Model,"
is based upon standards for the improvement of preliminary hearing procedure which have been promulgated and discussed by many authorities.
The Hearing Model strives to achieve the goals, solve the problems, and
silence the critics of the preliminary hearing through reforms that supposedly will improve the effectiveness of the hearing while providing
greater opportunities for criminal discovery. It seeks the solution to present
problems in a multi-purpose adversary judicial hearing which theoretically
would give anyone accused of crime (1) an early chance to test the legality of his detention; (2) a better opportunity to protect himself against
formal prosecution where there is inadequate "legal evidence" to establish

60. An intermediate type approach, no longer practicable after Coleman v.
Alabama, 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970), was suggested by D. Oaks and W. Lehman in A
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 53, n.91 (1968). This approach
would have involved placing the pretrial screening process principally in the hands
of the preliminary hearing court, thereby reducing the prosecutor's control over
charge decisions. While "judicializing" the charge decision, it would have deemphasized the adversary nature of the hearing by doing away with the right to
counsel, now guaranteed under the Coleman decision. This "would probably produce an increase, though small, in the number of defendants reaching trial court
for final adjudication ... ." Id. Oaks and Lehman anticipated that their proposed
system might be held unconstitutional for lack of counsel. Id. at 116-17.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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every element of the crime;6 1 and (3) a better means of obtaining greater
discovery of evidence.
Under the Hearing Model any arrested person must be brought without
unnecessary delay before a magistrate62 who is a member of the bar.63
The magistrate immediately must inform the person of the charge,6 4 of
his important right to counsel at every stage of the proceedings,6 5 that
counsel will be appointed for him if he is unable for any reason to obtain
counsel, 6 and of his right to have a preliminary hearing to determine the
legality of his detention.6 7 No waiver of assistance of counsel or of the
right to a preliminary hearing should be accepted unless the accused has
consulted with a lawyer.68 Unless the hearing is waived, the accused must
be allowed reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and should
be admitted to bail pending the hearing.6 9 The magistrate must hear the
evidence within a reasonable time,7 0 which should be strictly limited7 l
61. The goal is to give protection against formal prosecution and trial when
there is insufficient competent state evidence to make out a prima fade case.
Also, if the accused believes that he can sufficiently explain the evidence
against him or defend himself at the hearing so that the prosecutor or magistrate
will decide that the prosecution should proceed no further, the Hearing Model
provides the means for the accused to show his innocence. Cf. Goldstein, note 46
supra, at 1170-71, summarizing the various attempts to "judicialize" the grand
jury proceeding during the nineteenth century so that indictments would be returned only on the basis of "legal evidence." Statutes were passed in most states
permitting grand juries to hear the defendant or his witnesses. Then the feeling
arose in this century that the grand jury is a "rubber stamp" for the discretion of
the prosecutor. Id. This may have started the current trend to "judicialize" the
preliminary hearing.
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(a). If the
arrest was made without a warrant, a complaint must be filed forthwith. Id.
63. See authorities cited note 41 supra.
64. FED. R. Cium. P. 5(b); UNIFORM RULE Or CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 6(b);
ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 39 (1930).
65., FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(b); UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(b);
ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 39 (1930).
66. This is now required for state indigents by Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S. Ct.
1999 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b); see authorities and trend in note 19 supra. The
accused should be informed that counsel will be appointed for him if he is unable
to obtain counsel for any reason. Although normally made only for indigent persons, appointments should be made for unpopular persons and others who are
unable to obtain counsel. Waiver decisions should not be made without advice
of counsel, note 68 infra and accompanying text.
67. FED. R. CPi . P. 5(b) & (c); UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5(b);
ALl

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 39 (1930).
68. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERvicEs § 7.3 (Approved Draft, 1968). Ignorant waiver of rights is currently one of the most common causes of avoidance of the preliminary hearing. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 143 (1967); Miller & Dawson, Non-Use of the Preliminary Examination:
A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 252, 274. The accused must be
made to understand the great significance of his right to a hearing under the
Hearing Model.
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b); ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 44 (1930)
(bail if hearing postponed).
70. FED. R CUm. P. 5(b); see note 25 supra for possible alternative time
standards.

71. Many states provide that postponements may not be for more than two
days at a time, nor more than six days in all unless by consent of the defendant.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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unless good cause is shown for a continuance. 72 Under no circumstances
should the hearing date be set so that a finding of probable cause by indictment can intervene; 73 and the accused should be granted a hearing
even if an indictment does intervene.74 No information may be filed against
the person until he has had or waived the preliminary hearing. 75 Notwithstanding a waiver of the hearing by the accused, on demand of the prosecutor the magistrate shall examine the witnesses for the state. 76 At the
hearing, or at any examination of the state's witnesses before the magistrate,
the accused should be allowed to confront and cross-examine the witnesses, 77 and the magistrate should enforce the rules of evidence applicable
to trials, 78 including constitutional rules of admissibility.7 9 At the hearing

the accused must be permitted to testify or make a statement in his behalf,

ALl CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 43, Commentary (1930). See note 26 supra
for trends. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 85 recommends a 72 hour limit.
See Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in the Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess, at 105-6 (1966)
(objections to allowing 10 and 20 day limits in Federal Magistrates Act). The
government should be prepared to show probable cause within a few days; otherwise, the accused should not have been arrested and should not be detained.
72. ALl CODE OF CRIMINAL PRocrDuR § 43 (1980). The state should not be
granted a continuance to build its case, or the hearing loses its effect on investigative arrests. Unavailability of witnesses should not be good cause for more than
brief continuances. Hearings, supra note 71, at 105.
73. An indictment "moots" the hearing, note 51 supra, and this has become
an important reason for routine postponement of hearings until an indictment is
returned. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 220 (1966).
74. As long as grand jury proceedings remain secret and other discovery opportunities are limited, it seems unfair to permit the state to avoid the hearing
discovery opportunity simply by obtaining an indictment. Under the Hearing
Model, the accused would be permitted to compel the attendance of material
witnesses, including state witnesses, and examine them after indictment. The
magistrate should not be permitted to overrule the grand jury's finding of probable
cause.
75. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 115 (1930).
76. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(c); ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 40 (1930). The Hearing Model recognizes the potential value of the
hearing for perpetuating testimony and for the discovery of weaknesses in the
state's witnesses. Notes 35 &86 supra and accompanying text.
77. FED. R. Cimu. P. 5(c); UNIFORMlRULE OF CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE 6(c);
ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 46 (1930); see authorities and trend in note
22 supra. Confrontation is constitutionally required at some point if the testimony

it to be used at trial. See California v. Green, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970).

78. The state should not be permitted to avoid most of the discovery function of the hearing by relying upon hearsay evidence. Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 211 (1966). As a matter of practice, many federal magistrates exdude hearsay. Hearings on S. 945, supra note 58, at 493 (46% so reported). Few
states now follow trial rules of evidence at the hearinz, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2937.11 (Page Supp. 1969), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-8 (1966); see authorities
cited in Note, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Probable Cause in Grand
Jury Proceedings and Preliminary Examinations, 1963 WAsH. U. L.Q. 102, 116-18.
79. Under the Hearing Model we are concerned with the probability of
conviction at trial, an issue which forces the state to present more evidence, thereby
providing a better discovery opportunity for the accused. Unless the state can
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and to introduce evidence.8 0 At the request of either the state or the accused, the magistrate must issue subpoenas to summon material witnesses
within the state. 8 ' Unless both parties otherwise agree, all proceedings at
the hearing and all testimony at an examination must be recorded by a
court reporter or by an electronic recording device and transcribed.8 2
If a hearing is held, a prosecuting attorney should be present to represent
the state.8 3 If the hearing is waived or if it appears to the magistrate
after the hearing that there is probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the accused person has committed it, the
accused must be held to answer by admitting him to bail or committing
him to custody pending further proceedings in the trial court. 8 4 If the
accused is unable to furnish the amount of bail fixed, the magistrate
should order an immediate investigation to determine whether the accused
should be released on a lesser amount of bail or on his personal recognizance.8 5 In those cases in which the magistrate orders the complete
discharge of the person, no further prosecution on the same charge
should be permitted except by leave of the trial court.86 If the person is
establish at least a substantial possibility of conviction, based on admissible
evidence, the accused should not be put to the expense, humiliation, and anxiety
resulting from public prosecution. See note 61 supra.

80. FED. R. Crum. P. 5(c); UNIFORM RULE

OF CIMNAL. PRocEDuRE 6(c);

ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 49 (1930). Most states now permit the accused
to introduce evidence, note 21 supra, and many permit an unsworn statement by
the accused, note 20 supra.
81. UNIFORM RULE OF CaIMINAL PRoCEDURE 5(c). FED. R. Ca m. P. 17(b), requiring a "court" to issue subpoenas for indigent defendants upon a showing that
the witnesses are "necessary to an adequate defense," has been interpreted in
one circuit to grant a right to subpoena witnesses for the preliminary hearing.
Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557 (D.C.Cir. 1967), citing Washington v. Clemmer, 339
F.2d 715 (D.C.Cir. 1964). The subpoena right extends "to alibi witnesses ...
the complainant and other material witnesses named in the complaint who for
some reason have not been called by the Government." Id. at 718. Under the
Hearing Model, the trend would be to allow the accused to subpoena witnesses
to establish any defense, as this would be the only way to provide broad discovery
at the hearing.
82. Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (t (Supp. IV, 1969) requires a
court reporter or recordation by suitable recording equipment and a copy made
available to an indigent accused. See generally UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(c). A record is essential if discovery is a primary goal of the hearing.
83. Since the hearing is truly adversary under the Hearing Model, the magistrate cannot be expected to remain neutral while examining prosecution witnesses;
nor should police officers be permitted to prosecute. Responsible exercise of prosecutorial discretion requires early contact with the case. See generally PusimNxr's
COMMISSION REPORT

128, 133-34.

84. FED. R. CrIM. P. 5(c); UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(c). See
notes 61 &79 supra on the Hearing Model probable cause standard.
85. This approach would require lower court probation officers which most
states have not provided. PRESID NT'S COMMIssIoN REPORT 129. Another possible
approach requires the trial court to exercise supervision over detention pending
trial.

FED. R. CRim. P. 46 (h).
UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15 and ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 116 (1930) prohibit any formal charge by information after discharge

86.

but say nothing about later indictment. Under the Hearing Model the prosecutor
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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bound over, formal prosecution should be limited to the charge considered
at the preliminary hearing, or to a lesser included offense. 87
Further elaboration of the Hearing Model will not be necessary in
order to compare it effectively with present procedures and with the alternate procedures to be proposed. There may be disagreement with certain "improvements" of the Hearing Model, but it must be kept in mind
that the Hearing Model was designed to illustrate proposed "ideal" preliminary hearing procedures and to reflect current trends in legislation. 8S
B. Functional Frustrationsand Complications
The Hearing Model was designed to turn the preliminary hearing into
a more effective multi-purpose proceeding, and under ideal circumstances
it would provide many benefits not available under present procedures.
However, we should not be so overwhelmed by theoretical individual improvements that we ignore the practical disadvantages of further "judicializ89
ing" the hearing.
By first viewing the Hearing Model as a whole, we can see some of
the functional problems it would encounter. The most striking feature of
many hearings under the Hearing Model might be their resemblance to
full-scale trials. The Hearing Model merely continues the long-term trend
of adding "fair trial" procedures and safeguards to the hearing, many of
which may not be needed in the ordinary case. 90 Yet they are all available,
promising greater rewards to the defense counsel who demands a hearing,
while nothing is granted if the hearing is waived. If there were no broad
alternative means of obtaining criminal discovery, it would usually be
foolish for defense counsel to advise waiver of the hearing. 91 Thus if the
Hearing Model is promoted as a panacea, we probably would be faced
with increases in the number, length and cost of preliminary hearings.92
who fails to show probable cause would be required to show the trial court why he
should be permitted to file an information or to take the case to the grand jury.
By giving greater finality to a discharge, there is more justification for "judicializing" the hearing in various ways.
87. This is essential to guarantee some judicial review of the prosecutor's
charge decision and to provide preliminary hearing discovery on the trial court
charge. See K. Graham & L. Letwin, A STUDY OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN Los
ANGELES 124 (1969).
88. For trends in legislation since 1930, see notes 18-22, 24-26 supra.
89. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 46 at 1170-71, and note 61, covering efforts to

"judicialize" grand jury proceedings.
90. E.g., the accused can subpoena material defense witnesses under the Hear-

ing Model, supra note 81; but unless he feels that the state has a weak case or needs
process to compel a reluctant defense witness to reveal his story, the accused is not
likely to reveal the nature of his defense or his witnesses at the hearing.
91. But see Miller Sc Dawson, Non-Use of the Preliminary Examination: A
Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wis. L. Ryv. 252, in which the authors conclude
that the present system tends to maximize irrational waivers of the preliminary
hearing by many persons who do not understand its functions and significance and
who could benefit from the opportunity for discovery. Id. at 274.
92. The less criminal discovery that is available through other procedures and
the less effective the prosecutor is before the hearing in screening out weak cases,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

17

Missouri
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
35, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1
MISSOURI
LAW-

[vol. 85

Under the Hearing Model it could truly be said that any a6cused person
is entitled to "two days in court" because of the "preliminary trial" in a
lower court to determine the preliminary issue of probable cause.93 Unless many more magistrates, assistant prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
courtroom facilities were provided to conduct these adversary discovery and
probable cause hearings, delays would be certain to arise to deny many accused persons their statutory right to a speedy "preliminary trial" as well as
their constitutional right to a speedy jury trial. 9 4 In many cases prosecutors
faced with defendants demanding their early hearing rights and also faced
with a backlog of preliminary hearings might be pressured into making
"deals" just to avoid some hearings. 95
Assuming that adequate resources might be made available for the
Hearing Model to handle adequately a greater number of longer hearings
without delay, it would take the prosecutor and defense counsel more time
than at present to prepare for many hearings. With hearsay inadmissible
and witnesses to be subpoenaed throughout the state for some hearings,
it would be difficult to place any strict limitation on the "reasonable time"
within which the hearing must be held.96 To generalize about all this,
the more society tries to expand and improve the screening and discovery
functions of the hearing, the more time society should grant to each party
to prepare for and conduct a preliminary trial.97 Yet the longer the delay
before the hearing, the less early protection the hearing provides against
illegal arrest and detention.98
Many other difficulties will arise if the preliminary hearing is further
"judicialized." The Hearing Model requires all magistrates to be sufficiently
trained so that they can apply technical trial rules of evidence, including
the more likely it is that an accused person will demand a hearing. Emphasis on
criminal discovery and effective judicial screening at the hearing are likely to detract from establishment of other discovery procedures and from responsible prosecutorial screening.
93. In an overloaded criminal justice system this "preliminary trial" might become the final trial for many defendants. In Los Angeles the transcript of the preliminary hearing often is used at trial in place of witnesses. Known as "submission
on the transcript," this voluntary practice, based on stipulation of the parties, has
been sharply criticized. K. Graham & L. Letwin, A STUDY OF THE PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN Los ANGELES 142, 147.48 (1969).
94. Under U.S. CONST. amend. VI & XIV, the speedy trial right is applicable
to the states. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
95. Under the Hearing Model, prosecutors would not be able to take cases to
the grand jury to avoid time-consuming preliminary hearings. Note 74 supra. If a
time limit of 72 hours between the initial appearance and preliminary hearing were
adopted, supra note 52, extreme pressure could be brought to bear on a prosecutor
when backlogs developed, particularly if the person must be released if not granted
a prompt hearing. See Federal Magistrates Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
96. See notes 50, 52 &95 supra.
97. Unavoidable delays in gathering evidence for the hearing are "good cause"
for formal or agreed postponement of a hearing.
98, See note 49 supra.
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constitutional rules of admissibility.9 9 Even though the Hearing Model
insures that hearings can be demanded simply for discovery purposes, often
it would be easy for the prosecutor to present a minimum case establishing
probable cause for holding the accused for further prosecution without
revealing much of his case. 100 Rigid application of orthodox trial rules
of evidence would further limit the scope of discovery available at the
hearing. 10 1 On the other hand, if trial rules of evidence were not followed,
we could expect longer "discovery hearings" in which magistrates would
have to permit "fishing expeditions." It is difficult to see why valuable
court time should be wasted in a case simply to permit the parties to obtain
discovery or to take depositions to preserve testimony. Broad discovery is
available in civil litigation in most states, but there are no advocates of
civil "discovery hearings." Recording and transcribing the "depositions"
of all witnesses at these criminal "discovery hearings" often would be wasteful and could produce delays in proceedings after the hearing. 0 2 Finally,
even in contested cases there is ordinarily no difficult probable cause determination to be made.10 3 In many states the prosecutor normally screens all

99. See note 41 supra. Very difficult problems of exclusion of evidence on
constitutional grounds would complicate the hearing. Reserving such matters for
trial court action seems more appropriate and efficient, but by then the accused
ordinarily will have been charged publicly by indictment or information which may
have been based on unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The Alternate Model
seeks to solve this problem, notes 166 to 168 infra and accompanying text.
100. See note 47 supra. Although the prosecutor must present witnesses, not
hearsay, under the Hearing Model, there is no assurance that he will call all or even
most key witnesses to the hearing. Most prosecutors would soon learn how much
evidence a particular magistrate requires to find probable cause, which may be
much less than the amount of evidence that should be subject to discovery or the
amount of evidence a trial court judge would require to find a prima facie case.
101. Any questioning of witnesses would have to be relevant to the issue of
probable cause to be determined by the magistrate. Also, the scope of available
discovery would depend on the magistrate's views on relevance, which might vary
depending upon his caseload. K. Graham &L. Letwin, A SruDy or THE PRELIhMNARY
132 (1969). Ordinarily in taking depositions in civil
HEARING IN Los ANGELE
actions "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which
F R. C V.
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... FED.
P. 26(b). Such rules permit much broader discovery of information about the case,
much of which would be inadmissible at trial but could lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
102. In 1968 England abolished the practice of recuiring the prosecution to
present at the preliminary hearing all the evidence It intends to use at trial, including witness testimony. One reason for this action was the waste of court time
and effort in preparing depositions of state witnesses at the hearing stage in cases
in which the facts were uncomplicated and a plea of guilty likely. Criminal Justice
on the use of witness statements in
Seepreliminary
note 134 infra
c. 80, at
§ 1(1).
Act
hearings.
English
testimony
placeofof1967,
103. TAsK FORCE RESPORT: THE COURTS 48 (1967), which states, after listing
some of the deficiencies of present hearing procedures:
One major reason for these deficiencies is the fact that the preliminary hearing is designed to serve a function that is relevant to a small minority of
cases, that is, to test whether there is cause to hold an accused person for
trial. Yet this standard is clearly met in almost all contested cases. An overPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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felony cases at an earlier stage to determine if complaints should be filed, so
that in the vast majority of cases there will be sufficient competent evidence
to show probable cause for formal prosecution. 10 4
Upon encountering these and other functional problems of Hearing
Model procedures, some authorities no doubt would make further suggestions for refinements and "improvements" in hearing procedures. However, we have seen that functional compromises must be made in order to
"improve" a multi-purpose hearing, particularly in an urban environment.
As a result, the structure may not serve any major function well. An ideal
"probable cause hearing" cannot serve as an ideal "discovery hearing," and
an early "probable cause for arrest and detention hearing" cannot provide
the additional safeguards of a later "probable cause for formal prosecution
hearing."
In spite of these functional problems, many authorities argue that
we can justify retaining the preliminary "probable cause" hearing by making it more useful as a "discovery hearing."' 05 Such arguments have surface appeal, but their advocates are short-sighted and usually take no account of the functional compromises that would need to be made even in
the promotion of criminal discovery. Nor do they take account of the
danger of distorting, delaying or complicating the development of separate procedures to serve needs which an "ideal hearing" could not serve
well.100
Enough has been written to indicate why it is undesirable to further
"judicialize" the preliminary hearing. Formal, adjudicative, adversary factfinding hearings should be introduced into the criminal process only
when they are needed to determine important issues of fact. They should
not be called upon or maintained merely to serve multiple functions unrelated or only incidentally related to the ultimate factfinding function.

burdened system will not hold a large number of carefully conducted and
deliberative hearings when they are meaningful in only a small percentage
of the cases.
Yet the REPORT follows the Hearing Model trend by recommending that the
rules be changed to make the hearing more useful in perpetuating testimony and in
permitting fuller examination of witnesses, relying upon the good judgment of defense counsel to limit the number of hearings to manageable levels. Id.
104. Id. K. Graham & L. Letwin, supra note 101, at 98-99; see D. Oaks & W.
Lehman, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 41 (1968).
105. E.g., note 103 supra.
106. Modifications in procedure should not be made without appreciation of
the intrinsic relationships among the parts of the criminal process. Thus there is a
need for a unified legislative approach to procedural problems to avoid "patchquilt" results. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Reporters'
Introductory Memorandum at xviii-xix (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). Legislative inaction may lead to patchwork by the courts. See Coleman v. Alabama, 90 S.Ct. 1999
(1970); Note, PreliminaryHearing in the District of Columbia-An Emerging Discovery Device, 56 GEO. L.J. 191 (1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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III.

PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVES TO A MULTI-PURPOSE HEARING

Since the Hearing Model cannot effectuate the desired combination
of functions without compromise, it is submitted that we should develop
a set of alternative procedures that are specifically designed to serve these
functions. This does not mean that we must abandon all procedures of
the Hearing Model, but it does require us to resist forces pushing for "improvement" of the preliminary hearing along the lines of the Hearing
Model.
In developing alternatives to a "judicialized preliminary discovery and
probable cause hearing," we should promote practices and procedures which
directly or indirectly will lead to fulfillment of the ultimate objectives of the
Hearing Model. By focusing attention on ultimate goals and asking how
these objectives can best be attained outside the context of a multi-purpose
hearing, we are no longer confronted with the necessity of making great
functional compromises or supplementing the preliminary hearing with
procedures that may compensate for the compromises.
Although it could be argued that we should postpone drafting an
"Alternate Model" until more decisions are made on such current issues
as alternatives to arrest, the time and nature of initial appearance, bail,
and criminal discovery, there is a great danger that progressive developments in these and other areas of pretrial criminal procedure may be
limited or affected by the assumption that the preliminary hearing will
be "judicialized," turned into an instrument of discovery, or at least
left in its present form. Before this happens we should consider the possibility of abolishing the preliminary hearing or minimizing its use.
A. The Alternate Model
The Alternate Model is constructed for comparison purposes and to
indicate one approach that might be taken to maintain the protections
of an early preliminary hearing while emphasis is placed on other pretrial
procedures. The major differences between the Alternate Model and the
Hearing Model are based on the assumption that separate procedures
tailored to meet special needs at separate stages of the criminal process
will work more efficiently and effectively to protect the interests of the
parties than a single, multi-purpose adversary hearing. These separate procedures will not be built around a hearing to serve as supplements to its
inadequate performance. Instead, they must justify their separate existence
by better serving functions which the preliminary hearing would serve under
the Hearing Model.
Like the Hearing Model, the Alternate Model is built upon certain
ideals. Separate procedures must be developed (1) to provide early protection against illegal detention, (2) to provide better protection against
formal prosecution when there is inadequate "legal evidence" to establish
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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every element of the crime,107 and (3) to provide better-criminal discovery
opportunities.08
Since the need for procedures to test the legality of arrest and detention does not arise until there has been a "seizure" of a person, the
Alternate Model promotes procedures that would discourage the common
police practice of arresting and holding persons indiscriminately without
making any attempt to determine whether arrest or detention of the person
is needed to insure his appearance in -court.109 A citation or summons to
appear in court can be used safely for certain types of indictable offenses,"10
particularly when the accused has sufficient ties with the community so
that the risk of flight is minimal."'
Once an arrest is made, any person not released from police custody
within a brief time1 12 must be brought as soon as possible before a mag-

107. Note 61 supra. The Alternate Model also aims at developing effective
procedures to challenge prosecutions based on illegally obtained evidence. Note 99
supra. Like the Hearing Model, the Alternate Model seeks to protect innocent and
"guilty" but unconvictable persons from exposure to adverse publicity and the
burdens of trial, but through more effective procedures than could be made available at the preliminary hearing stage.
108. Early discovery under the Alternate Model will not be limited by trial
rules of evidence that would be applicable to "judicialized" preliminary hearings.
Separate discovery procedures, tailored to provide the amount of criminal discovery
deemed appropriate by society, would be available.
109. W. LaFave, ARRr.sr 168-69 (1965).
110. Encouraging experiments have been conducted showing that if police are
furnished information upon which to judge whether a person should be arrested,
citations and summonses may be issued, saving many police man-hours in guarding
and transporting arrested persons to their first court appearance. These procedures
have been used in various felony and serious misdemeanor cases. See Hearings on
Bills to Revise Existing Bail Practices in U. S. Courts, and for Other Purposes, before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess., at
88-89 (1966) (description of Manhattan summons project expansion to serious
misdemeanor and felony cases); PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN REPORT 132-33 (recommending prompt release of as many arrested persons as possible upon issuance of
citation or summons).
Recommended standards on police authority to issue citations include serious
offenses. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRiAL RELEASE § 2.3 (Approved Draft,
1968) (stationhouse release).
III. Of course, police must be required to investigate any person they propose
to arrest and hold or the practice of indiscriminate arrest and detention will continue. Exceptions should be made for dangerous felonies, where arrest is always
appropriate.
112. Any arrested person not released by the arresting officer should be brought
immediately to a police station. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAGNMNT PROCEDURE
§ 3.09 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). There a station officer should warn him of his
Miranda rights, that as soon as possible he will be taken before a magistrate who
will make arrangements for him to be represented by counsel if he has not done so,
and that he will not be questioned prior to his appearance before the magistrate
unless he has a lawyer who is present or has consented to such questioning. ALI
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § C 1001 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968).
The Alternate Model seeks to reduce the need for early judicial procedures to remedy investigative arrests by removing the greatest incentives for such arrests. The
preliminary hearing probably never could be held sufficiently early to provide
much deterrence against investigative arrests. See note 97 supra.
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istrate,113 who is a member of the bar.114 Whether or not a complaint
has been filed, the magistrate must inform the arrested person of the charge
for which he is being held, of his immediate right to counsel, 115 that
counsel will be appointed for him if he is unable for any reason to obtain
counsel immediately,"1 6 and that early assistance of counsel is important
for a person in his position. 117 If no prosecutor's complaint has been filed
before the initial appearance, the police must obtain a complaint from the
responsible prosecutor within a few hours after the arrest. 1 Thus the
common practice of having an early charge decision made by the prosecutor
is mandatory under the Alternate Model. 119 Unless the prosecutor re-

113. Cross-references will be made in the following footnotes to related portions of the Hearing Model. Note 62 supra and accompanying text. An early appearance before a judicial officer is needed to deter investigative arrests. Any delay
in the initial appearance must not be based on a need to conduct further investigation or questioning to provide probable cause for detention. See generally Hogan
&cSnee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1,
22-23, 27 (1958). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not deprive police
of the incentive to arrest suspects for questioning in the hope that they can be
induced to waive their constitutional rights to silence and counsel before they fully
realize their importance.
Some identification procedures, notably fingerprinting and photographing,
might be permitted before appearance, because the delays they might cause would
be minimal and there is no need for the protection of counsel. Lineups before
appearance would not be permitted. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRa-ARRAIGNMNT
PROCEDURE § C 1002 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968).
114. Note 63 supra and accompanying text. Although ordinarily no early hearing will be held under the Alternate Model, only a lawyer would be likely to have
the necessary knowledge and independence of the prosecutor and police to serve
as an effective judicial screen against investigative arrests.
115. The station officer will have given the first warning of rights, note 112
supra. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DF.ENsE SERvicEs § 5.1 and
Commentary (Approved Draft, 1968), advocating provision of counsel as soon as
possible after arrest.
116. Note 66 supra and accompanying text. See ALl

MODEL CODE OF

PRE-A-

CD 1004 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968).
117. Id. The role of counsel is important to the proper functioning of the
Alternate Model. The accused should not be asked to depend upon the magistrate
or prosecutor for adequate protection against unjustified detention and prosecuRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §

tion. See TAsx

FORCE REPORT:

THE COURTs 52 (1967); Miller ScDawson, Non-Use

of the Preliminary Examination: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wis. L. REv.
252.
118. Complaints in indictable cases should be filed only by a prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction over prosecution of the offense. ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGN1MNT PROCEDURE § 6.02(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). If an arrest is made
without a warrant, as most arrests are, the police should be given a short period of
time to inform the prosecutor about available evidence and the circumstances leading to the arrest so that he can determine whether the case can successfully be prosecuted in court. Absent express prosecutor control over the filing of complaints, the
first screening will be done by the police, followed by the magistrate, before the prosecutor's influence will be felt. See D. Oaks &c
W. Lehman, A CRM.AL JUSTICE SvsTmr
AND THE INDIGENT 30-31 (1968) (Cook County, Illinois experience).
119. D. Oaks S W. Lehman, supra note 118, at 29, describing the anomaly of the
"post-arrest warrant" by which prosecutors in some states control which arrests will
lead to prosecution. In Los Angeles County the District Attorney's office issues felony complaints in about 50% of the felony cases presented-by, the police, and about
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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quests a remand for a lineup or other identification procedures 120 or
can show other "good cause" for a brief postponement before making a
charge decision, 121 the person must be charged within this limited time or
122
released from custody.
An early judicial check against illegal arrest should be available in
cases of arrest without a warrant. 12 3 Under the Alternate Model the police
must deliver to the magistrate within a few hours after arrest a sworn
statement narrating the events and police observations upon which the
police and the arresting officer concluded that a particular crime had been
committed and determined that there was probable cause for the arrest. 24
Upon receipt of the police arrest statement the magistrate must determine
whether there was probable cause for the arrest, and in the absence of
25% of the persons arrested on felony charges are released outright as a result of
police or prosecutor screening, mostly prosecutor screening based on insufficiency of
evidence. K. Graham 8. L. Letwin, A STUDY OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN Los
ANGErS 76-77 (1969). Such figures suggest that if the police policy is to exercise
little discretion in enforcement (a common policy), prosecutorial control over the
charge decision is needed to screen out weak cases. Most busy prosecutors would
have a bias in favor of early elimination of weak cases, before they get to court.
120. ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNIENT PROCEDURE § CD 1007 (Study Draft

No. 1, 1968) (remand if it appears necessary to determine whether complaint should
issue). To prevent investigative arrests for lineup purposes, the magistrate must
find reasonable cause to believe that the lineup or other procedure is likely to
result in information necessary for the charge decision. Id. § CD 1007 (1). Unless
the magistrate believes brief continued custody is necessary to insure later appearance at the identification procedure, he should release the person on condition that
he appear for the procedure. Id. § CD 1007(3). If the magistrate makes a determination that the police had no probable cause for the arrest, note 125 infra
and accompanying text, the person should be relieved of any obligation to submit
to further identification procedures.
121. The Alternate Model requires early screening by the prosecutor through
close communication with the police. The prosecutor would have "good cause" for
a brief postponement of a few hours if some of the expected evidence needed to
make a decision were unavoidably unavailable and apparently would be available
soon.
122. See ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § CD 1006 (Study
Draft No. 1, 1968). Early release would not prevent later arrest and prosecution if

additional evidence were discovered. Nor would it be inconsistent with a provision

for remand for questioning if the person is represented by counsel or has waived

counsel, and consents to such remand, id. § CD 1008.
123. Otherwise, police would seldom obtain an arrest warrant based on a

prosecutor's complaint and could make investigatory arrests with impunity. A prosecutor's decision not to charge would not provide adequate basis for a suit for false
arrest, nor would a later preliminary hearing determination of no probable cause.
The hearing is basically suited for determining probable cause for further detention and prosecution, not probable cause for arrest.
124. The duty of having to sign such a statement should make officers consider

the issue of probable cause seriously before arresting. A tremendous saving of police

time would result if arrest statements were used in place of court appearances by
police. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 42, 91, recommending use of a "written
statement of the facts of the offense prepared by the officer immediately after the
arrest and signed by him." More police time could be saved with the aid of modern
communication and recording devices. E.g., statements could be dictated over the ra-

dio by an officer on duty in the field to be signed later. Initially, a tape recording of
the report might be delivered to the magistrate to establish probable cause.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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probable cause he must release the person from custody unless the police
have obtained additional information justifying another arrest.125

After a complaint is filed under the Alternate Model, the magistrate
must inform the accused of the charge against him,126 of his continuing
right to counsel,127 and of his right to have a "probable cause determination" to test the legality of holding him on the charge for further proceedings.' 28 No attempted waiver of assistance of counsel or of the right
to a probable cause determination 12 9 would be accepted unless the accused
has consulted with counsel.13 0 The probable cause determination is not a
preliminary hearing at which witnesses for the state and the accused are
examined, although witnesses for the state sometimes may appear for questioning.1 81 Its purpose is the determination, ordinarily from statements
of state witnesses, whether there is probable cause for binding over and
for further detaining the accused in jail, on bail, or under conditional
release pending proceedings in the trial court. The accused who is bound
125. Under the Alternate Model there is no hearing at this point. However,
in borderline cases the magistrate might contact or send for the arresting officer for
further information or questioning before deciding whether or not to release the
person.
It would be almost futile to release the person arrested without probable cause
if the police would arrest him again immediately because of information not contained in the police arrest statement. The police should be given a very brief time
to file a supplemental arrest statement.
126. Note 64 supra and accompanying text.
127. Early proceedings under the Alternate Model would be adversary only in
the sense that counsel could appear to argue the question of the legality of further
detention. Later, if a probable cause determination is held, the accused may make
an explanatory statement and at times witnesses may be called for the state and be
subject to cross-examination. However, the role of counsel is important to the
proper operation of the Alternate Model.
128. "Probable cause" at this point relates more to probability of guilt than

to probability of conviction. Note 132 infra. If the accused is bound over he will

have opportunities in the trial court, after exercising discovery rights, to challenge
his formal prosecution by indictment or information. It seems more appropriate
and realistic to deal with probabilities of conviction at a later stage in the trial court.
129. As will be seen, the statements of state witnesses and any other evidence
upon which the probable cause determination would be made provide a foundation
for immediate out-of-court discovery rights if the accused is bound over. If the
accused waives the determination, the state still must present sufficient written evidence to the magistrate to establish probable cause to hold him, but the magistrate
will automatically bind him over without examining the evidence. To insure that
the state will present sufficient written evidence to hold the accused, thereby creating a sufficient evidentiary basis for defense discovery, conditional waiver of the
determination should be permitted. If defense counsel feels that probable cause is
lacking after examining the state's written evidence, he could then demand a determination. See notes 184 & 135 infra on the use of statements and other written
evidence.
180. See note 68 supra on ignorant waiver and common avoidance of the preliminary hearing.
181. In some cases the prosecution may not have time to get all the witnesses'
statements needed or the prosecutor may wish to subject one or more of his witnesses to rigorous examination and cross-examination to determine the strength of
the case. See notes 85 c 86 supra. The Alternate Model attempts to preserve these
benefits for the prosecution.
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over, either after a probable cause determination or a final waiver of the
determination, will have a later opportunity in a more appropriate forum
to demonstrate that there is no "probable cause for prosecution."' 3 2
If the accused requests a probable cause determination, it should be
held within forty-eight hours after the arrest.18 3 Prior to the time for the
determination, or within three days after the arrest if the determination
is waived, the state must deliver to the magistrate and to the accused's
attorney copies of sworn statements of state witnesses 3 4 and a report of the
132. As the state exercises increasing degrees of control over the individual,
procedures giving increased protections against official abuse should be made available to the accused. The Alternate Model seeks to provide increasing protection
in stages rather than to depend upon an omnibus "preliminary trial" (Hearing
Model) or a "probable cause determination," note 128 supra, to decide all questions
at one stage.
At the "determination" stage, note 128 supra, the probable cause question would
be whether the state has presented sufficient evidence, assuming that its witnesses
who gave statements or testified and the other evidence produced or described in
the written report will be available and admissible at trial, to "lead a man of
ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong
suspicion of the guilt of the accused." People v. Shaffer, 182 Cal. App.2d 39, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 844, 846 (1960). The state should present at least some evidence to support
each element of the offense in order to justify holding the accused.
At the "probable cause for prosecution" stage the trial court may be asked to
determine questions of admissibility of evidence and then may be asked to decide
whether there is sufficient competent, legal evidence to establish every element of
the crime. The Alternate Model accepts the goal of the Hearing Model that no
person should be tried or publicly prosecuted unless the prosecution can satisfy
a judge that it has a prima facie case. Note 61 supra.
133. A shorter time limit can be fixed for holding a hearsay determination of
probable cause, based on witnesses' statements, than for holding an adversary preliminary hearing to which prosecution and defense witnesses must be summoned.
134. Considering that early discovery by deposition will be available under the
Alternate Model, sworn statements of the state witnesses relied upon to establish
probable cause should provide adequate "preliminary discovery" to the accused
and an adequate basis for "preliminary screening" by the magistrate.
Since January 1, 1968, commitments for trial in England have been permitted
without a preliminary hearing where all testimonial evidence submitted to the
magistrate consists of written statements, the accused is represented by counsel, and
neither party objects to the use of statements. Criminal Justice Act of 1967, c. 80,
§ 1 (1). The statements tendered to the committing magistrates are the originals
taken from witnesses by police. Id. § 2 (2). The witness swears in the statement that
it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief and that he made the statement
knowing that, if it were tendered in evidence, he would be subject to prosecution
for any willful falsehood. Id. § 2 (2) (b). Before any statement is offered in evidence
a copy must be delivered to the accused. Id. § 2 (2) (c). If the accused objects to a
statement the magistrate must require the witness to appear and testify, subject to
cross-examination. Id. § 2 (4). However, the accused has no later right to take the
deposition of a witness whose statement is used in place of testimony, and there is
no later opportunity to challenge the prosecution of the case. Unless the accused
requests apdetermination of "no submission" for trial, the committing magistrates
do not even have to examine the statements to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to put the accused on trial. Id. § 1(1).
England abolished the grand jury and substituted the committing magistrate
in 1933 because of the expense, inconvenience and limited safeguard of the grand
jury system. The Administration of Justice Act, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1. Since 1848,
the prosecution has been required to present at the preliminary hearing all evi.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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prosecutor describing specifically the nature of any other evidence1 85
relied upon to establish probable cause to hold the accused.13 6 Whether
or not the statement of a particular witness had been taken, the magistrate
and the prosecutor would have discretion to call witnesses into court for
questioning, 3 7 even if the accused waives the determination.38 Any witness so called must confront the accused and be subject to cross-examination. 3 9
At the probable cause determination, after the magistrate has examined
and heard any evidence for the state, he should inform the accused that
he may make a statement, not under oath, or be sworn and testify regarding
the charge against him. 140 However, the accused may not call other wit-

dence it intends to use at trial. Indictable Offenses Act, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42. Use
of witness statements now saves much police, witness and court time. See generally
D.

NAPLEY, A GUIDE TO LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CRIAnNAL JUSTICE

Act

oi

1967 6-12 (1968); A. Krulwich, The Committal Proceeding in England: Its Uses and
Abuses 64-65 (1968) (unpublished manuscript on file at Institute of Criminal Law,
Georgetown University Law Center).
If the state can show good cause for not disclosing the identity or statement
of a certain witness, or a witness is temporarily unavailable, the prosecutor should
be permitted to make a proffer of the expected evidence to establish a basis for
holding the accused. Sometimes sworn statements of anonymous informers could
be taken and furnished to the accused without the name. Later the trial court could
make a decision on whether discovery should be permitted and whether a protective
order is needed. If the procedure just outlined appears subject to abuse by the
prosecution, grand jury proceedings could be made the exclusive means of maintaining initial secrecy, subject to trial court control of later discovery by the accused.
See note 161 infra and accompanying text.
135. The report might include a summary of chemical, fingerprint and other
tests relied upon, and a description of physical evidence. Such a report, plus state-.
ments of witnesses containing references to the described physical evidence, should
provide a sufficiently reliable basis for determining probable cause to bind over.
The state could present physical evidence at the determination if necessary; otherwise, use of the report would avoid possible later prosecution difficulties in establishing the "chain of possession" foundation for admission of the evidence at trial.
136. Note 132 supra sets out the test for probable cause at the "determination"
stage.
137. This discretion is given to the magistrate and prosecutor in England. Criminal Justice Act of 1967, c. 80, § 2 (4). Although the accused would not be permitted
to call witnesses under the Alternate Model because of his later discovery and
screening rights, in some cases the accused might convince the magistrate or prose.
cutor that by questioning a certain witness immediately the case might be disposed
of without further proceedings. Although the prosecutor can take depositions or
require witnesses to furnish security for their later appearance under the Alternate
Model, see FmD. R. CRIm. P. 15 (a) &c46 (b), he may prefer to have some of them
appear in court for questioning. See notes 35 &c36 supra.
138. The prosecution should not be deprived of any benefits it might derive
from a hearing simply because the accused decides to waive his rights.
189. See note 37 supra. If the prosecutor or magistrate chooses to question a
witness, his deposition might as well be taken at this point for possible use as evidence. Signed statements or testimony without confrontation at any time could
be used only for impeachment at trial. See State v. Green, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970).
140. ALI CODE OF C~aimNAL PROcEDURE §§ 47, 49 (1930). Note 80 supra and

accompanying text permit such a statement under the Hearing Model. The accused
sometimes may want to make a statement or to explain the evidence against him.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

27

Missouri
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
35, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1
MISSOURI
LAW

[Vol. 35

nesses.141 Unless both parties agree otherwise, the testimony of any witness
who testifies shall be recorded and transcribed.142
If the determination is waived, 43 or if it appears to the magistrate from
all the evidence that there is probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the accused has committed it,'44 he must
hold the accused to answer by releasing him on order to appear, on his
own recognizance,' 4 5 or after imposing the least onerous condition reasonably likely to assure the accused's appearance in 'the trial court. 146
The early definition of the most appropriate conditions for release
becomes the focus of great attention under the Alternate Model. 147 Release of the accused on bail or appropriate alternative conditions removes
48
the main burden suffered by a person "bound over" to the trial court.'
The magistrate should have the responsibility of minimizing unnecessary
detention pending the probable cause determination and the initial responsibility, at least, for minimizing unnecessary detention after the accused is bound over.14 9 An inquiry should be conducted concerning all personal factors relevant to the determination of appropriate conditions for
release of the accused unless the prosecutor does not oppose release on order
to appear or on the accused's recognizance. 50 This inquiry should com141. Since the accused will be able to obtain discovery and present the resulting
evidence to the trial court at a later stage, there is no need to turn the "determination" into an adversary proceeding or hearing. Compare this with notes 80 &c81
supra and accompanying text.
142. Note 82 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 129 supra on conditional waiver, which would cause a slight delay
in binding the accused over until defense counsel was satisfied that the state evidence established probable cause.
144. Note 132 supra states the burden of proof at the determination stage. The
magistrate would not consider arguments that the evidence was obtained by unconstitutional means, unless this were clearly the case, nor weigh the credibility of state
witnesses, unless their statements or testimony were incredible.
145. Unless the prosecutor objects to such release, it should be automatic. See
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 4.4, 4.5 (a) (Approved Draft,
1968).
146. If the prosecutor opposes release on recognizance or order to appear, the
magistrate should determine whether such release is unwarranted before imposing
supervision or other reasonable restrictions on8146
the accused.
(1969). Id. § 5.2, listing various
restrictions; see Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §
147. It is recognized that the early probable cause determination will not give
as much protection to a few "innocent" persons as an early preliminary hearing
might provide. No doubt a few more of these persons would be bound over and
held for further proceedings, resulting in greater delay before their ultimate release from the system. By minimizing early detention for all persons, the Alternate
Model seeks to minimize the burden on these few innocent persons as well as the
guilty while achieving major economies. See D. Oaks c W. Lehman, A CriminalJustice System and the Indigent 52 (1968); cf. note 110 supra. Imprisonment of even the
"guilty" person pending trial is harsh and oppressive unless warranted by a legitimate purpose of the criminal process. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE § 1.1 and Commentary at 28-25 (Approved Draft, 1968).
148. See ABA STANDARDS, Commentary at 28-25, note 147 supra.
149. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
150. Note 145 supra. Factors relevant to release conditions are listed in ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE § 4.5 (d) (Approved Draft, 1968).
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mence as soon at it appears that the accused should not be released on an
order to appear or on his own recognizance. 1 51
As soon as the accused is bound over, he would be entitled to confront
and take discovery depositions of any witnesses whose statements were relied
upon by the state to show probable cause. 152 Depositions taken out of court
at an early stage of the proceedings should be an adequate substitute for
cross-examination and discovery by the accused at the preliminary hearing. 153 The accused also could take depositions of other witnesses with
the consent of the prosecution or by obtaining permission of the trial
court.1

4

In addition, the accused should be permitted to inspect and copy

or photograph any evidence described in any written report filed with the
magistrate to show probable cause.' 5
Additional discovery mechanisms could be added under the Alternate
Model. For example, the accused might be permitted to file interrogatories
to be answered by the state. The state should be granted certain discovery
rights, carefully limited to avoid infringement of the accused's privilege
to remain silent and not to produce evidence at trial. 5 6 For the protection
of both the state and the accused, the trial court should be permitted to

151. Id. § 4.5 (a).
152. Thus the Alternate Model provides a sound basis for automatic early discovery rights. The need for early discovery procedures and the scant attention paid
to this need in the past are emphasized in TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 43-44:
It is undesirable to confine the use of depositions only to the preservation
of testimony of witnesses who may be unavailable at trial. Depositions may

be used to find facts as well as to preserve testimony. A deposition could
resolve a factual dispute during the negotiating stage, and it could provide
the basis for a stipulation of witnesses' testimony at trial. In cases where it

is not necessary to conduct a full preliminary hearing before a judge, depositions may be submitted to the court for determination of probable cause.

Finally, the depositions of certain witnesses may be made a part of the record
in order to demonstrate in court the basis for a negotiated guilty plea. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 43.
153. This requires public support to help defray the cost of discovery depositions. In the case of the indigent accused, the entire cost would have to be paid by
the public. However, this procedure should be less expensive than paying for all
witnesses to appear at a preliminary hearing and having a court reporter take down
and perhaps transcribe all their testimony. Also, a primary goal of the Alternate
Model is to save court time that is now wasted when an accused uses the preliminary hearing occasion simply to obtain discovery or when he demands a hearing
because of ignorance of the state's case in the vain hope that probable cause will

be found lacking.

154. The trial court should be liberal in authorizing extra depositions requested by the defense. Many grounds for further discovery could be recognized,
see ABA STANDARDS RELATING To DISCOVERY AND PROcDutE BFoRE TRIAL § 1.1
(Tent. Draft, 1969). The prosecutor might disclose written or recorded statements
of other witnesses to the accused and avoid the need for some formal discovery.

Id. § 2.1 (a).

155. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 16 (b) and note 185 supra.
156. See FED. R. CumU.P. 16 (c) ; Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 872 P.2d 919 (1962).
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order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or to
make such other protective orders as are appropriate. 157
No formal charge by post-arrest indictment or prosecutor's information
could be publicly filed or made known until the accused has waived or
has had a reasonable time to exercise these initial discovery rights' 5 8 and
his right to challenge the filing of a formal charge in the trial court.'5 9
If the accused is arrested after the return of a grand jury indictment,
he must be brought as soon as possible before the trial court and
informed of the charge, of his immediate right to counsel, of his right
to discover the evidence upon which the indictment was based, of his
right to additional discovery, and of his right to challenge the filing of
the indictment.160 The indicted defendant should have the right to a postindictment determination of probable cause under rules which give him
approximately the same amount of discovery and protection as the defendant who is charged by information. 161 Therefore, he should be given a
copy of the indictment and signed statements of the testimony of each
witness who appeared before the grand jury. 62 He should be entitled to
take the discovery deposition of any witness who testified, to inspect and
copy or photograph any other evidence presented to the grand jury, and
to exercise any other discovery rights in the same manner and to the same
extent as if he had been arrested and charged by complaint, subject to any
power of the court to deny, restrict, or defer discovery or to make other
appropriate protective orders.' 63
157. FED. R. Cram. P. 16(e); see ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RE§ 5.5 (Approved Draft, 1968).
158. The accused should be granted a reasonable time after receiving the state's
written evidence within which to exercise his discovery rights and to decide whether
to challenge formal prosecution. It would be difficult to fix an absolute time limit,
but diligent pursuit of discovery should be required.
159. Note 167 infra and accompanying text.
160. Under the Alternate Model an indictment returned by laymen, but not yet
publicly filed, is given the same respect as a judicial finding by the magistrate
that there is probable cause to hold the accused for further proceedings. Therefore, the accused arrested after indictment should have rights equivalent to those
given the accused charged by complaint.
161. The trial court cannot maintain control over the filing of formal charges,
note 166 infra, and the accused cannot challenge a prosecution effectively if the
prosecutor can avoid discovery and the trial court screening process simply by going
to a "rubber stamp" grand jury to obtain an indictment prior to arrest. See note 51
supra. If early secrecy is important, the prosecutor may use the grand jury to conduct a closed investigation and to return indictments without immediately having
to reveal his case. All discovery after indictment could be made subject to trial
court restriction for good cause shown. See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
162. The shroud of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings in most jurisdictions should be removed. At least five states now give the accused an absolute
right to inspect grand jury transcripts prior to trial: California, Iowa, Kentucky,
Minnesota, and Oklahoma. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DIscovERY AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL 65 (Tent. Draft, 1969). The ABA Advisory Committee recommends
that grand jury testimony be revealed to the accused. Id. § 2.1 (a) (iii) and at 66.
163. Several states permit discovery depositions by the accused after a formal
charge is filed, e.g., § 545.400, RSMo 1969. See notes 154, 155 & 157 supra.
LEASE
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As in the case of post-arrest indictments and informations, no formal
charge by pre-arrest indictment could be filed or made public until the
accused either has exercised or waived his post-indictment discovery rights
and his right to challenge the filing of the formal charge in the trial
court.

64

Thus

it should make

little practical

difference

under the

Alternate Model whether the accused is arrested before or after indictment,
and the prosecutor will have little or no incentive to take a case directly
to the grand jury. 65
Under the Alternate Model the trial court, not lower court magistrates, would be given greater control over formal prosecution by indictment or information. 160 As previously stated, prior to the public filing of
any formal charge, the accused would have a right to challenge his formal
prosecution. He could "move to dismiss the case" on the ground that
there is no "probable cause for prosecution."' 167 The accused would be
required to combine with his motion to dismiss any related motion for a
return of property illegally seized or to suppress any evidence illegally
obtained. 168 -The decision on these motions usually would be based pri164. Note 158 supra; note 167 infra and accompanying text.
165. See note 161 supra.

166. An underlying premise of the Hearing Model is that trial court judges
are in a better position than lower court magistrates to decide difficult questions
of admissibility and the ultimate "probable cause for prosecution" issue. Also, it
might appear unseemly for a lower court magistrate to overrule indictments in the
trial court.

167. Any dismissal would be without final prejudice, and the prosecution could

start over if more evidence became available. Note 173 infra and accompanying
text. Note 132 supra sets out the "prima fade case" standard to be applied by the
trial court in determining whether there is "probable cause for prosecution."
The Alternate Model seeks to provide better protection against public indictments based on incompetent, illegal, or insufficient evidence. Consider Judge
Frank's statement in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (1947):
The government . . . argues that an indictment founded upon such
illicit evidence will do the applicant no harm, since such evidence will
not be admitted at the trial which follows the indictment. That is an
astonishingly callous argument which ignores the obvious. For a wrongful
indictment is no laughing matter; often it works a grievous, irreparable
injury to the person indicted. The stigma cannot be easily erased. In
the public mind, the blot on a man's escutcheon, resulting from such a
public accusation of wrongdoing, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent
judgment of not guilty. Frequently, the public remembers the accusation,
and still suspects guilt, even after an acquittal (Emphasis added).
New York courts quash indictments based on incompetent, illegal or insufficient evidence, since the grand jury is supposed to screen out cases unless
"convinced ... [that] the evidence . . . , unexplained and uncontradicted, would
warrant a conviction by a trial jury." N.Y. CODE GRIiM,. PROC. § 251; People v.
Jackson, 18 N.Y.2d 516, 223 N.E.2d 790, 277 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1966) (evidence held
insufficient to sustain a conviction, indictment dismissed). However, under New
York procedure the accused is publicly indicted before the indictment can be
challenged.
But see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
168. FED. R. Caum. P. 41 (e). See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (1947), and Judge
Frank's statement from the Fried case, note 167 supra.
In DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962), the Supreme Court held
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marily on depositions and other discovery obtained by the state or the
accused, a transcript of the sworn statements of state witnesses and witness
testimony presented to the magistrate, and any stipulations of the parties. 169
After examining the written evidence and contentions of the parties, the
court in its discretion could receive additional evidence and would listen
17 0
to oral argument on any issue of fact or law necessary to a decision.
If the right to challenge formal prosecution were waived, or if the court
believed that the state had shown sufficient admissible evidence to warrant
a conviction by a jury, the formal charge could be filed and made public.17 '
17 2
Otherwise, the case would be dismissed and the defendant discharged.
No later prosecution on the same charge could be initiated except by leave
73
of the trial court upon good cause shown.'
that there is no finality and can be no appeal from a pre-indictment motion to
suppress ruling because of serious disruption to the conduct of a criminal case.
For this same reason, interlocutory appeals from pretrial rulings against the accused under the Alternate Model would not be permitted. However, the accused
still should receive more initial protection from a trial court pretrial ruling than
from a lower court ruling.
169. Any hearing at this stage would be limited in scope by the discovery
presented by the parties. The Alternate Model would not save much court or
witness time if anything like the Hearing Model preliminary hearings were held
at this stage. Few hearings or "determinations" of probable cause for prosecution should be anticipated at this stage, for the written evidence ordinarily would
be more than adequate to support formal prosecution.
Some authorities might object to the use of witness statements to help the
trial court make a final determination of probable cause or a preliminary determination of admissibility of evidence, since there may have been no confrontation of the accused with a particular witness. However, under the Alternate Model
the accused would have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine any state
witness relied upon to establish probable cause or the admissibility of evidence.
In addition, it is the right to confront the witnesses against him at the time of trial
which is the basic guarantee of the sixth amendment. See California v. Green, 90
S. Ct. 1930 (1970). A grand jury finding of probable cause constitutionally may be
based solely on hearsay. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
170. See note 169 supra. If the probable cause question were close, either
the prosecutor or defense counsel might wish to present more evidence. The court
should be given control over the amount of additional evidence presented to
prevent any hearing on the probable cause issue from turning into a preliminary
trial. However, the court ordinarily would want to receive all evidence available
on a motion to suppress evidence to prevent relitigation of the question at the time
of trial. See note 169 supra on the confrontation problem.
171. See note 132 supra on the "probable cause for prosecution" standard.
It would not be the court's function to attempt to judge credibility, unless the
story of a witness were incredible. However, if the accused could show through
limited discovery that the state has a weak case, perhaps because one or more
witnesses are unreliable or because an excellent defense has been found, the
court couldperform the valuable function of advising the prosecutor that it would
be wise to drop the case or to reduce the charge before a formal charge is filed,
even though the state technically might be entitled to proceed. The prosecutor
probably would heed the court's advice unless he had additional evidence to
present at trial to cover the weak points in his case.
172. If an indictment had been returned to the court, it should be kept
unfiled and secret or destroyed. The grand jury is sworn to secrecy and this
should cover dismissed indictments.
178. Note 86 supra and accompanying text. In some cases additional evidence
will be found, and the prosecutor could ask the court's permission to proceed
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1
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Although it would be possible to go into greater detail to answer
more of the questions raised by the Alternate Model, further elaboration
could complicate and distort its comparison with the previous outline of the
Hearing Model and with present procedures.
It should be apparent that many combinations of separate procedures
could be put together to form viable models for comparison purposes.
There may be disagreement with a few or many of the provisions of the
Alternate Model; however, it incorporates many procedures recommended
by authoritative groups that have taken stands on contemporary issues.
Thus it should serve as an adequate basis for comparison with the Hearing
Model and should help us to determine which type of approach should
be taken not only to solve present problems, but also to establish a procedural framework that can be adapted to meet future needs.
B. Competing systems in operation in an urban environment
A comparison of the Hearing Model and Alternate Model could be
made through general or specific observations about apparent advantages
and disadvantages of each system. However, enough has been written about
the goals and theory of each model, and about the functional disadvantages
of the Hearing Model, to enable the reader to form some tentative conclusions.
Perhaps the best way to "test" these models and to make a fair comparison before final conclusions are drawn is to attempt to visualize them
in operation in a typical urban environment. In order to do this, let us
examine two allegories about identical twins, D1 and D2, each of whom was
arrested for allegedly committing grand larceny 174 of a suit of clothes. Dl
was arrested in city Cl and D2 in city 02. Both cities are located in state
S and are identical in every respect except that the pretrial criminal process
in C1 operates under the Hearing Model, while in C2 the Alternate Model
is followed. We will follow each case through the early stages of criminal
proceedings, including appearances before lower court magistrates, M1 in
C1 and M2 in 02, both members of the bar. Assistant prosecutors P1 in
Cl and P2 in 02 represent the state, and defense attorneys DC1 in C1 and
Dc2 in 02 are appointed and adequately paid to represent Dl and D2
throughout the proceedings.
Additional background information is needed. To make the cases
more relevant to current problems and to the contemporary reappraisal of
by way of information or indictment. The accused should be notified and given

an opportunity to contest further prosecution.

174. The applicable larceny statute of state S provides:
Every person convicted of larceny if the value of the property stolen
exceeds the value of 50 shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less
than one, nor more than 10 years; if the property stolen is of the value
of $50, or less, the person convicted shall be confined in the county jail
not exceeding one year, and be fined not exceeding $100. [Based on ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 389 (1961)].
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pretrial criminal procedure, the allegories will include more difficulties
than might be encountered in the ordinary criminal case. However, by
keeping this in mind, any danger of distorting the comparison of the
Hearing Model and Alternate Model in operation will be minimized.
Prior to arrest, D1 and D2 had been living together in a small apartment in city X in state Y, 500 miles from state S. Both were indigent
at the time of arrest, as they had just started working as traveling salesmen
for employer E after a long period of unemployment. D1 had gone to C1
and D2 to C2 in search of new customers. Neither DI nor D2 had been
in state S before, and neither of them had any friends or acquaintances in S.
After the reported thefts policemen in C1 and C2 found eyewitnesses
who had seen a man running from the respective clothing stores in C1 and
C2 carrying a suit. The two eyewitnesses to each theft gave a detailed description of the man to police, but a description that many men would fit.
Dl was arrested in C1 and D2 in C2 because they seemed to fit the descriptions. En route to the Cl and C2 police stations, Dl and D2 were asked to
state their business, their local address, and to account for their whereabouts
at the time of the thefts. D1 and D2 each explained that he was a traveling
salesman staying at a nearby hotel, and each admitted being in the neighborhood of the clothing store at the time of the theft. They each denied
stealing anything but said that it would be nice to be able to afford a new
suit. No Miranda warnings were given by police prior to these statements. 175 On the way to the police stations the arresting officers in C1
and C2 stopped at the local hotels named by Dl and D2. When DI and D2
each refused to consent to a search of his room, the officers obtained permission and a key from the hotel manager to enter and search the room.
A suit was found and seized in each search that matched the description
of the stolen suit; however, no price tags or other identifying marks from
any clothing store were found. DI and D2 each told the arresting officers
that he had purchased the suit in X at a certain clothing store.
In C1, Dl was brought as soon as possible before M1,176 who informed
him of the grand larceny complaint that the police were filing against
him,' 77 of his right to counsel and of the importance of counsel for a person in his position, and of his right to a preliminary hearing on the
charge. 7 8s Upon learning that DI was indigent, Ml appointed DC1 to represent him. After filing the grand larceny complaint, the arresting officers

175. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
176. Note 62 supra and accompanying text, the first provision of the Hearing
Model.
177. The Hearing Model makes no formal provision for prosecutorial control
over the filing of charges by police who arrest without a warrant. Of course, police
faced with what they believe is a difficult legal or factual problem may consult
the prosecutor for advice before filing a charge. See TASK FORCE REPoRT: THE
COURTS

122.

178. See notes 65 to 67 supra and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss3/1

34

1970]

Anderson: Anderson: Preliminary Hearing
PRELIMINARY HEARING

went back on patrol before DC1 appeared. 179 DC1 arrived and conferred
briefly with his client, read the charge, and then demanded an immediate
preliminary hearing. Ml denied the request and explained that it would
not be possible to hold a preliminary hearing for at least four days because
of a backlog of requested hearings and his knowledge that P1 and the
police would need time to subpoena state witnesses.1 8 0 MI then scheduled
the hearing to be held in four days but cautioned DC1 that a further postponement might be necessary, depending upon the lengths of previously
scheduled hearings.' 81 Since Dl was unknown in Cl, Ml automatically fixed
182
bail at $1,000, and Dl was committed to jail pending the hearing.
In C2, D2 was taken before M2 immediately after a brief stop at the
police station.18 3 M2 informed D2 that he had been arrested for grand
larceny, of his right to counsel and of the importance of counsel for a person in his position.18 4 When he learned that D2 was indigent, DC2 was
immediately appointed to represent him. While waiting for DC2 to arrive,
M2 explained that the police would have to obtain a complaint from the
prosecutor within a few hours or D2 would be released,18 5 unless the prosecutor could show good cause for a brief postponement or a remand before
making a charge decision.1 8 6 DC2 arrived and asked to see the police arrest
statement. 8 7 M2 had his clerk call the police station and learned that the
statement would be delivered within an hour. In the meantime P2 called
M2 and requested a remand for a lineup because he felt an eyewitness
identification should be made before he could justify filing a charge.' 88
At this stage it would be rewarding to compare what might happen to
D1 and D2 as a result of these early proceedings and the options open to
them and to their attorneys.
179. Officers on duty who make arrests commonly would have to spend much
of their working time in court if they had to go to or remain at the initial
appearance until defense counsel arrived. Since a preliminary hearing may be
held soon, see note 25 supra, normally a magistrate automatically accepts any
police complaint after a warrantless arrest.
180. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
181. MI seldom could predict in advance how long each of the preliminary
hearings on his calendar would last under the Hearing Model. Even if taxpayers
were willing to provide extra magistrates and courtroom facilities, there would
be times when backlogs would build up temporarily, providing "good cause" for
postponement beyond any short time limitations. See note 71 .supra.
182. Because they are unknown in Cl and C2 and nonresidents of the state,
neither DI nor D2 could expect to be released on recognizance or order to appear.
However, under the Alternate Model more arrested persons should be released
at an early stage without bail. See notes 147 to 151 supra and accompanying text.
While Ml is busy conducting preliminary hearings to clear his calendar, M2 can
devote more attention to making appropriate conditional release decisions and
is more likely to carry out his duty of minimizing unnecessary detention.
183. Notes 112
13 supra and accompanying text.
184. Notes 115 to 117 supra and accompanying text.
185. Notes 118 &c122 supra and accompanying text.
186. Notes 120 &c121 supra and accompanying text.
187. Note 124 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 198 &c199 infra and accompanying text for an explanation
of the prosecutor's position.
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In Dl's case, P1 might not learn much about the events leading to
the arrest and the filing of the complaint by police until the preliminary
hearing, scheduled for four days after the arrest. 189 In the meantime Dl
probably would be languishing in jail 9 ° unless he or DG1 could contact
E, Dl's employer, and get him to put up bond. Dl may or may not be
placed in a lineup during this period to see if the eyewitnesses can identify
him.' 0 ' If one or both of the eyewitnesses identifies DI or says that he
looks like the man seen running from the clothing store, at least one eyewitness probably will be subpoenaed to attend the scheduled hearing to
make another identification. 192 DC1 may not be able to learn the identity
of either eyewitness before the hearing, depending upon whether there is
a lineup and the attitude of P1 and the police about revealing their case
beforehand.1O3 Even if DC1 learns the identities of the eyewitnesses, perhaps at the time of a lineup, they may refuse to discuss the case with him.194
DCl may or may not be able to learn from the arresting officers the precise
grounds for the arrest. Even if he discovers that there was no probable cause
for the arrest because the eyewitness descriptions were not specific enough,
it is unlikely that he could secure the release of his client by a writ of habeas
corpus.'9 5 If DI gives DC1 the name of a store clerk who supposedly sold
189. Under the Hearing Model the preliminary hearing is supposed to serve
the purpose of providing preliminary discovery, and the police and prosecutor
are not required to provide any discovery before the hearing. "The proper scope
and extent of discovery of police reports and witness statements is a matter of
heated controversy .... " TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 42.
190. P1 has no duty or incentive under the Hearing Model to review the
police decision to charge. Even if he happens to determine that the arrest of DI
was without probable cause and that illegal activities led to the illegal seizure
of the suit in Dl's hotel room, he could not be expected to ask Ml to dismiss
the police complaint before the preliminary hearing. See note 118 supra.
191. Thinking that they have the thief and sufficient evidence other than
eyewitnesses (the suit) to establish probable cause at the preliminary hearing,
Cl police may not hold a lineup. Instead they may follow the practice of showing eyewitnesses a series of pictures, including Dl's mug shot, in the absence of
DC1. See notes 223 8: 226 infra and accompanying text on the impropriety of this
procedure in this case. If no positive identification were made from the pictures by
either of the eyewitnesses, DCl might not learn about it until the time of the hearing, if then; and it might be too late to contact and subpoena the eyewitnesses to
testify at the hearing, unless a continuance could be obtained.
192. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
193. Many prosecutors and police departments are reluctant to disclose anything about the state's case which can be withheld. Since secrecy as late as the
trial is still a legitimate tactic in criminal proceedings in most states, it is unlikely that many prosecutors or police departments would consider it wise to
reveal the state case prior to the preliminary hearing. Secret identification procedures, see note 191 supra, may continue to be used unless early lineups are required or made necessary by early administrative screening procedures like those
of the Alternate Model.
194. TASK FoRcE REPORT: Tun CouRTs 43. Since he has no official status
like the prosecutor and police, witnesses often refuse to discuss a case with defense
counsel.
195. Cf. note 46 supra and accompanying text. With the hearing date so
close and considering the probability that police would immediately arrest Dl
again because of later-discovered evidence, few courts would grant such a drastic
remedy for an illegal arrest.
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him the seized suit in city X, DC1 could not subpoena the witness from
state Y to attend the hearing over 500 miles away in state S. 196 In short,
DC1 is in a very poor position to investigate the case for D1 prior to the
hearing or to take early steps to secure his client's release from custody.
D2, on the other hand, is in a much better position. P2 has an immediate duty to review the circumstances of the case with the police before
making his charge decision. 197 Assuming that a prosecutor under the
Alternate Model would act as a responsible screen at this stage, P2 should
soon discover that the descriptions of the two eyewitnesses are the only
"legal" evidence in the case. 198 P2 should then convince M2 of the need for
an immediate remand for a lineup. 199 DC2 would be present at this early
lineup and should learn the identities of both eyewitnesses, since the police
would be taking their statements and DC2 should have an opportunity to
see whether improper suggestions are made to them when their statements
are taken. 20 0 DC2 should get copies or be allowed to inspect the eyewitness
statements whether or not P2 intends to rely upon both statements to show
probable cause. 20 ' If neither eyewitness positively identifies D2 at the lineup, P2 probably would not file charges and D2 would be released. 20 2
196. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. While 45 states have enacted
reciprocal legislation to obtain the testimony of unwilling witnesses who are
nonresidents or who have fled the state, in the form of the UNIFORM ACT TO
SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEED-

INGS, see 9 UNIFORM LA-s ANN. 50 (Supp. 1967), the Act does not make provision for

preliminary hearings. Even if the Act were amended to cover preliminary hearings, there would not be time to comply with its provisions before the preliminary
hearing should be held.
197. Note 118 supra and accompanying text.
198. P2 should learn while questioning the arresting officers that they failed
to give D2 any Miranda warnings after arresting him and before any questioning,
note 175 supra and accompanying text, and that without D2's consent the search
of his hotel room was illegal even though police had obtained the hotel manager's
consent. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (consent of hotel clerk to
search insufficient).
199. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. An early lineup here appears
likely to result in information necessary for the charge decision.
200. DC2 must be notified of the lineup and counsel's presence is a requisite
to a lineup, absent an "intelligent waiver." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967). The writing down of the witnesses' responses upon viewing the accused
should be regarded as a "critical stage" of the lineup procedure under the Alternate Model, which requires the preparation of witness statements. See note 134
supra and accompanying text.
201. See D. Napley, A GUIDE TO LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CRIMNAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1967 10-11 (1968). Speaking of the new English procedure of committing cases for trial on written statements, he speculates:
Another benefit likely to follow is a change in the climate of police
opinion in relation to the supplying of evidence and information in advance of the hearing. Until now it has been virtually impossible to extract
copies of witnesses' statements, or information as to the details of the case,
from the most cooperative of police officers. Generations of them have
been reared in the belief that nothing should be disclosed which can
be withheld. As time passes, they may become so used to serving copies
of statements, that they may become more disposed to serve them in respect
of all the witnesses even in summary cases. Id.
202. Note 198 supra and accompanying text.
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Thus at this early stage D2 might be released, while DI probably would
be languishing in jail and anxiously looking forward to his preliminary
hearing. Since the police ordinarily do not or could not screen cases as
carefully as a prosecutor, who is much less likely to rely on illegally obtained
evidence in making a decision to prosecute, DI might remain charged and
in jail even if he were not positively identified in a police lineup.
Proceeding with the story, let us assume that one of the eyewitnesses
has made a positive identification of D2 in a properly conducted lineup
requested by P2. After P2 files a grand larceny complaint, DC2 demands
a probable cause determination.20 3 Since most probable cause determinations in C2 are waived and the rest are based primarily on witness statements served on the accused, M2 has no backlog of probable cause determinations to make. He sets an early date for the determination, two days
after the arrest, which will give the state time to obtain witness statements. 204
Prior to the time scheduled for the determination, DG2 receives sworn statements of the eyewitnesses describing the man they saw leaving the clothing
store and containing their responses at the time they saw D2 in the lineup. 20 5
He receives a sworn statement of the manager of the clothing store describing the suit taken by the man and listing a "fair cash value" 2 06 of over
$50, the dividing line between grand and petty larceny. DC2 also receives
sworn statements of the arresting officers about the circumstances of the
arrest and the seizure of the suit from D2's hotel room. 207 Finally, he receives a report of the prosecutor describing other evidence relied upon to
show probable cause, including a description of the clothing D2 was wearing when arrested. Some of this other evidence may have been identified
by witnesses and referred to in their statements. 2 08 If P2 should choose to
rely upon the suit found in D2's hotel room to help establish probable
cause, the statement of the store manager might include a reference to it as
the suit or that it looks like the suit taken from his store.209
After receiving and examining all this written evidence, DC2 would
have several options. He could prepare to argue, if feasible, why the state
had not established probable cause to hold D2. He could consult with his
203. Note 128 supra and accompanying text.
204. Notes 133 & 134 supra and accompanying text.
205. See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
206. People v. Fognini, 374 Ill. 161, 28 N.E.2d 95 (1940), so interpreted the
statute, note 174 supra. For a grand larceny conviction the state must prove
the "fair, cash market value at the time and place of the theft." Id. at 165, 28
N.E.2d at 97.
207. To avoid duplication of effort, the arresting officers' sworn statements
could be included and delivered to the magistrate and defense attorney as part of
the police arrest statement, note 124 supra and accompanying text.
208. Note 135 supra and accompanying text. In more difficult cases involving
numerous exhibits, the prosecutor might wish to call one or more witnesses to
the determination to tie in the evidence.
1
209. See note 135 supra. Of course, D02 could challenge this identification
later by discovery, but he would probably wait and move to suppress the suit
as evidence in the trial court. See note 198 supra.
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client about what explanation, if any, he could and should give in response
to the state's case. 21 0 In this particular case DC2 might decide that the written evidence clearly establishes probable cause for holding D2, and he could
decide to save the court's time by advising his client to waive the deter2 11
mination so that they could proceed immediately to the discovery stage.
DC2 is not faced with the "all or nothing" decision which DI and DCl
have to make with respect to waiver of the preliminary hearing, for D2 can
move to dismiss the case at a later stage in the trial court when he is better
prepared to argue and to prove a case for dismissal.2 1 2 In the meantime
DC2 would build a case by discovery to support a motion to suppress any
illegally obtained evidence, like the suit which was illegally seized from
D2's hotel room. 213 DC2 also might seek to prove by deposition that D2
bought the suit in X, as he told police, 214 or that suit was not worth $50
as claimed by the manager of the clothing store.2 1 5 This discovery could
lead to early informed negotiations about disposition of the case on a mis-

210. Note 140 supra and accompanying text.
211. To achieve a maximum rate of intelligent waivers of the determination,
there should be a requirement in the Alternate Model that all written evidence
upon which the state intends to rely must be served on the defense attorney at
least a few hours before the scheduled determination. Under present procedures
and the Hearing Model there is often no way for counsel to determine prior to
the preliminary hearing whether the state can show probable cause, and thus

no way to make an intelligent waiver. Moreover, under the Hearing Model defense counsel could never waive the hearing if he wished to pursue early discovery.
Thus the Hearing Model would increase the number of preliminary hearings,

while early discovery under the Alternate Model should decrease the number of
probable cause determinations.

212. Note 167 supra and accompanying text. Of course, if there is a case to
be made against D2, the state also should be better prepared by that time.
213. If P2 were not willing to stipulate that the suit was illegally seized,
DC2 could take the depositions of the arresting officers and should be permitted
by the trial court to take the hotel manager's deposition so that a full hearing on
the motion to suppress would not be necessary.
214. DC2 is not limited by the inability to subpoena witnesses from out of
state to attend a hearing, see note 196 supra and accompanying text. If DC2 could
find the store clerk in X who allegedly sold D2 the suit that was seized from his
hotel room in C2, he could photograph the suit for identification purposes, note
155 supra and accompanying text. If the clerk and perhaps the store records in
X may back up D2's story, DC2 should be permitted by the trial court to take the
clerk's deposition on written interrogatories. Note 154 supra. A convincing deposition from the clerk might convince P2 that D2 is not the thief and lead to dismissal
of the case. D1 could not obtain such discovery at this stage and in most states
never would be able to obtain defense evidence in this manner. Note 163 supra.
215. D2 has the right to confront and cross-examine the store manager about
the suit and its cost, how long it has been in stock (he might subpoena the store
records), and any other relevant details. Note 152 supra and accompanying text.
DC2 could prepare for cross-examination by checking with other clothing merchants to determine the "fair cash value" of such a suit in C2. In a borderline
case, the trial court should permit DC2 to take other depositions on value before
deciding whether there was a prima facie grand larceny case. See notes 154 and
167 supra and accompanying text.
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demeanor larceny charge, 210 or DC2 might convince P2 or the trial court
2 17
that the case should be dismissed without any public prosecution.
Returning to the case of D1,we find him making his second appearance before M1 four days after the initial appearance. Fortunately, no postponements were caused by the unavoidable unavailability of any key state
21 8
witness or the unexpected length of other hearings previously scheduled.
As the hearing starts, Dl and DC1 are expecting to learn much more about
the state's case, and they hope that P1 will not be able to present enough
evidence to show probable cause for formal prosecution. 21 9 DC1 was unable to discover the identities of all of the state's witnesses prior to the
hearing, and he has no idea what some of them' will say. 220 Thus he does
not feel he should advise his client to waive the hearing. DC1 hopes that
his renowned ability to "think on his feet" will permit him to cross-examine
all the witnesses effectively in order to expose and freeze inconsistencies and
weaknesses in their testimony and to discover other evidence which might
221
aid him in plea negotiations or in preparing for trial.
P1 produced one eyewitness at the preliminary hearing who identified
Dl as the man he had seen running from the store with a suit. P1 also
called the arresting officers, who related the events leading up to the arrest,
and the store manager, who described the suit taken and gave a $60 estimate
of its value.
DC1 diligently cross-examined each state witness. The eyewitness admitted that there had been another eyewitness at the scene, but neither he
nor the arresting officers knew his name or whereabouts. 222 The eyewitness
also testified on cross-examination that he had first identified DI from a
223
series of police mug shots shown to him two days prior to the hearing.
When DCl learned that none of the other persons pictured in the series of
mug shots resembled DI (who has a very swarthy complexion) and that
the eyewitness was some distance from the clothing store when the man
ran out and away from him, he moved to strike the eyewitness identification
216. P2 or the trial court might decide that the charge should be lowered
to petty larceny, and D2 would at least avoid the stigma of having been publicly
charged with a felony. If plea negotiations take place, discovery prevents nego-

tiation in ignorance.

TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 44.

217. See note 171 supra.
218. See notes 72 & 97 supra.

219. Compare this "one shot" approach under the Hearing Model with the
"multiple opportunity" approach of the Alternate Model, which includes a final
opportunity to check the prosecution through trial court action.
220. See notes 189 & 193 supra.
221. See notes 32 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
222. Since there was no lineup, the police would have little motive to have
the eyewitnesses view the pictures at the same time, which might provide a basis
for impeaching their mug shot identification technique. The arresting officers
usually would not handle the identification procedure or serve as detectives to
investigate the case.
223. See note 191 supra. Dl would not have the benefit of prosecutorial
screening that probably would lead to an early lineup. Notes 197 to 199 supra
and accompanying text.
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on constitutional grounds. Based upon recollections about the decisions
in United States v. Wade224 and Stovall v. Denno,225 he argued that in the
absence of counsel the police had used improper suggestion in showing
photographs to the eyewitness and that there was no clear government evidence that the hearing identification of DI was based upon any observation
of DI other than his photograph. Therefore, he claimed that D1 had been
denied due process of law. P1 responded by arguing that the Wade and
Stovall "lineup" cases could easily be distinguished, 226 and that the matters
revealed on cross-examination affected only the credibility of the eyewitness
identification, a matter for the trial jury. Of course, neither DC1 nor P1
had submitted briefs on the unanticipated issue. 227 M1 overruled DC1's
motion with the explanation that Wade and Stovall could be distinguished
and that in any event the issue could be raised again in the trial court.22 8
If P1 had decided to present the suit found in Dl's hotel room to
help establish probable cause,2 29 DC1 might have been faced with a similar
situation and attitude on the part of M1.230 A busy magistrate can always

224. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel at lineups).
225. 888 U.S. 298 (1967) (unnecessarily suggestive confrontation with eyewitnesses may deny due process).
226. Pl might have cited Simmons v. United States, 890 U.S. 377 (1968), permitting mug shot identifications in the absence of counsel; but DCl also could
rely on Simmons and argue that the photographic identification procedure was
"so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." Id. at 884.
227. Seldom would the defense counsel or prosecutor be able to anticipate

all difficult evidentiary problems in advance of the preliminary hearing or have
time to do extensive briefing. Thus evidentiary problems and constitutional issues

probably would be argued in most instances in the "rough and tumble manner"

described by K. Graham and L. Letwin, in A STUDY OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING

iN Los ANGELS, at 4844 (1969).
228. However, under the Hearing Model the issue could not be raised again
until after a public charge in the trial court, perhaps not until the trial when
the state asks the eyewitness to identify D1 again.
229. In the absence of a prior duty to screen the evidence, see note 198 supra
and the Alternate Model, many prosecutors might rely on the magistrate to rule
on evidentiary questions.
230. Here it seems less likely that Ml would pass the buck to the trial
court than in the "mug shot" situation, note 191 supra, for one of the functions
of a magistrate is to determine whether there is probable cause to issue search
warrants. With his greater knowledge of the law of search and seizure, Ml might
be familiar with cases like Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (consent of
hotel clerk to search insufficient).
However, the judges of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of Criminal Law, in considering the possible use of U. S. commissioners
to decide difficult constitutional questions, were "unanimous in feeling that those
questions were too difficult to submit to any commissioner, no matter how well
qualified he might be." Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 148 (1965). As
a result, Warren Olney III, the Director of the Administrative office of U. S.
Courts, recommended doing away with the preliminary hearing and replacing
it with a deadline on indictments and a hearing after indictment before the trial
court to decide "all issues relating to the legality of arrest, the promptness of arraignment, the legality of search, the admissibility of all admissions or confessions
.. '."
Id. at 128.
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take the convenient position that in the absence of briefs from both sides
on a debatable or difficult question of constitutional law, particularly when
there is other evidence apparently establishing probable cause, it might be
better to give the state the benefit of the doubt and leave the decision to
the trial court. 2 3 ' A busy magistrate who takes such a position is unlikely
to grant continuances so that the parties can prepare and submit briefs on
unanticipated issues of law.
DC1 carefully cross-examined the store manager, who had testified that
the "fair cash market value" of the stolen suit was $60. He learned that the
suit had been purchased at a wholesale cost of $55 and had been stolen from
a "sales rack" of suits. The manager could not remember when he had purchased the suit, although he admitted that he might be able to get this
information by examining his purchase records. DC1 moved for a continuance on the grounds that he might be able to find defense witnesses who
would testify that the suit was not worth $50 and that this would give the
store manager time to check his records for the purchase date. M1 denied the
continuance, stating that he had heard enough evidence on value to establish probable cause to hold Dl for prosecution for grand larceny and would
not grant a continuance based on counsel's speculation about a possible
i
defense. 2 2
We can now further summarize and compare the relative positions of
Dl and D2 at the end of the initial proceedings in the magistrate court.
Both were bound over to the trial court and probably will remain in jail
pending further proceedings. 23 3 However, D2 is in a much better position,
as partially outlined above.2 34 He cannot be prosecuted publicly by indictment or information unless he waives or until he exercises his initial discovery rights, after which he may take further action against formal prosecution. If he exercises these discovery rights, DC2 will not be cross-examining
essential state witnesses from a position of ignorance. 285 As a result of discovery, D2 may be able to secure his discharge prior to any public felony
charge by moving to suppress certain evidence and to dismiss the grand
larceny case.236 If this does not result in a complete release, it may precipi231. See notes 42 to 44 supra and accompanying text. The Hearing Model
would do little to prevent these problems even if many more well-trained judges
were provided.
232. "Good cause" required for a continuance, note 72 supra, applies not
only to the state but also to the accused. He should not be permitted to secure
a continuance and prevent a bindover merely by showing that there might be
some defense available if he were given more time to investigate. Here the state's
evidence on value shows a substantial possibility of conviction of grand larceny,
see note 79 supra.
233. Note 182 supra.
234. Notes 210 to 217 supra and accompanying text.
235. Notes 205 to 209 supra and accompanying text.
236. A motion to dismiss, note 167 supra and accompanying text, need not be
directed at the entire prosecution, but in the alternative could request at least
a dismissal of the felony prosecution. If the magistrate court has sole jurisdiction
of misdemeanors, a dismissal of the grand larceny charge because the suit is not
worth $50 would mean that P2 could go back to the lower court to prosecute.
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tate plea negotiations or lead to a charge reduction in the trial court to
petty larceny. P2 may be saved from a humiliating total or partial defeat
at trial, and the state may be saved the expense of an unnecessary jury trial
237
which might at most result in a petty larceny verdict.
D1 is in a precarious position after the preliminary hearing. He has
received very little protection from formal prosecution and probably will
not receive any more judicial protection. 23 8 P1 is likely to move quickly to
file an information or to obtain a grand larceny indictment in the trial
court. Thus there is little time and no good incentive for DC1 to move for
trial court suppression of evidence which should not be relied upon as a
basis for a formal charge. He might as well advise his client to wait until
after the formal charge is filed and then make a pretrial motion to suppress.
DC1 might enter early plea negotiations with P1, but after the preliminary
hearing he would be bargaining from a relative position of weakness and
ignorance in spite of his valiant attempts to discover more of the state's
evidence and to suppress certain evidence. 23 9 He may be able to obtain more
discovery after a formal charge is filed, but by then P1's bargaining position
will be more limited and inflexible. 240 And by that time severe damage
may have been done to whatever reputation D1 had as a good citizen, he
may have lost his job, and he will find it more difficult to return to a normal
241
life even if he is acquitted at the trial.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Any sound reappraisal of pre-trial criminal procedure must take
into account the past development as well as the proper future role of
the preliminary hearing. With only legislative history as a guide, we might
predict a continuation of the twentieth century trend to "judicialize" the
237. Discovery by the accused will often aid the prosecutor, who has a great
interest in maintaining a high "win record" to facilitate the disposition of cases
before trial by guilty pleas.
238. Another judicial screening procedure could be built into the Hearing
Model; however, there would be a great waste of judicial time and effort if both
the magistrate and the trial judge were required to determine whether the state
could show probable cause for prosecution.
239. Dl would be in a better position if he had funds to pay for private investigation, so that he could informally provide P1 with information that might
cause him to drop or reduce the charge. The Alternate Model permits formal
discovery and presentation of evidence to the court, thus reducing the danger
of overreaching by the prosecutor during plea negotiations which operate in an
informal, invisible manner. See generally TASK FoRcE REPORT: THE CouRTs 9-11

on the dangers of informal and uninformed plea bargaining. Any court reviewing
the basis for a guilty plea under the Alternate Model would have a sound basis
for determining whether or not to accept the plea.
240. Plea negotiations after the filing of a formal charge are likely to be restricted in scope by the limited alternatives then available. See TAsK FORcE REPORT: THE CouRTs 135 (Detroit, usually restricted to reducing charge or by plea
to one of several offenses charged).
241. See Judge Frank's statement in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (1947), note
167 supra.
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hearing by the addition of more "fair trial" procedures. 242 However, added
to this we have a judicial history of numerous efforts to "judicialize"
the hearing. The recent "right to counsel" decision in Coleman v. Alabama243 portends increasing pressure on state courts and legislatures to
grant more rights to the accused in connection with the preliminary hearing and may portend future efforts to guarantee that a hearing must be
held unless waived. If this judicializing trend continues, we can predict
that the present statutory right to a preliminary hearing will turn into an
absolute statutory or perhaps even a constitutional right to a "preliminary
trial" on the issue of probable cause. We would then be confronted with
at least a de facto "two trial" criminal process.
However, in our increasingly urban society the numerous theoretical
benefits of such a "preliminary trial" would seldom be realized in practice. Again using past history as a guide, we would predict that "assembly
line preliminary trials" would be held in overloaded lower court systems.
Even if there were a constitutional mandate to hold preliminary hearings,
it is doubtful that society would willingly provide sufficient additional
resources to permit development of an adequate "two trial" criminal
process. Furthermore, considering the functional compromises that must
be made in any attempt to improve a preliminary, adversary, multi-purpose
judicial hearing, it does not appear sensible in theory to "judicialize" or to
absolutely require the hearing-assuming that better and less costly alternative procedures could be made available.
It is easier to find reasons why "model" preliminary hearing procedures
have not and could not be expected to perform well than it is to find or
develop a system of better alternative procedures. However, an Alternate
Model has been designed and "tested" in this article to help determine
whether there are viable and better alternatives to current and proposed
Hearing Model procedures. The Alternate Model contains a set of procedures that would almost eliminate the application of trial court rules
in early stages of the criminal process, while the Hearing Model indicates
how the system would operate if current trends are continued and most
criminal trial rules and rights became applicable to the preliminary hearing.
The allegories about DI and D2 show that the combination of procedures in the Alternate Model should operate more efficiently, effectively
and economically in achieving the goals of Hearing Model procedure. In
addition, the allegory about D2 and his Alternate Model experiences indicates that these procedures would provide great protection to an accused
person in an urban environment, without hampering law enforcement. Finally, since most of the features of the Alternate Model have already been

defined in recent progressive proposals for reform, there appears to be a
242. See notes 18 to 22, 24 to 26 supra.
243. 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970).
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solid foundation for a viable new system of procedures if we abandon Hearing Model trends and sentiments.
A basic strength of the Alternate Model is its premise that a trial
court judge is more responsible and capable than the ordinary magistrate
to make important decisions affecting the prosecution of a case. If the
trial judge is able to make accurate decisions on whether there is probable
cause for prosecution, the role of the preliminary hearing can be eliminated
or played down. And if the trial judge can make most of these probable
cause determinations without full hearings, as contemplated under the
discovery-oriented Alternate Model, the savings made by eliminating or
phasing out the preliminary hearing will not be wasted on later probable
cause hearings in the trial court.
Obviously, the Alternate Model system is not the only viable combination of procedures that could be substituted for the "one shot" multipurpose preliminary hearing. Anyone who still considers the preliminary
hearing sacrosanct or who disagrees with some of the procedures in the
Alternate Model might prefer another combination of procedures and perhaps a real test of an alternate system. In order to give courts, law enforcement officials, and defense attorneys a chance to test an alternate system
and to adjust to it in practice, a state could adopt the system temporarily
as an optional set of procedures. Defense attorneys who have promoted
improvements in the preliminary hearing to aid their clients should have
no objection to the addition of an alternate system of procedures that
could be used in place of the preliminary hearing at the option of the
attorney. And prosecutors who find the preliminary hearing useful should
have no objections to an alternate system either, particularly if it follows
the Alternate Model in permitting but not requiring prosecutors to call
witnesses before the magistrate to establish probable cause.
In conclusion, it is submitted that we should abandon efforts to "improve" the preliminary hearing and concentrate on developing more flexible alternative procedures which will better perform the basic functions
of the preliminary hearing while respecting the needs of law enforcement
and the accused.
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